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America loves its startup companies in good times and bad.  
Widespread losses from the dot-com bubble are not far behind us,
1
 yet we 
continue to praise entrepreneurs as engines of economic growth and job 
creation.
2
  More recent economic turmoil and upheaval only strengthened 
the sentiment.  Thomas Friedman put it succinctly in a 2009 editorial:  
―Start-ups, not bailouts:  nurture the next Google, don‘t nurse the old 
G.M.‘s.‖
3
 
In many respects, current public policy reflects this enthusiasm for 
startups.  State and local governments make tax credits available to 
investors in startups, and entrepreneurs have received billions in public 
funding for new ventures.
4
 
 
 * Partner, Miller Nash LLP.  J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., University of Puget 
Sound.  Thanks to C. Brooke Dormire for his helpful comments. 
 1. See Chad Bray, Judge Tentatively Approves IPO Settlement, WALL ST. J., June 11, 
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124473596936806625.html (reporting tentative 
settlement ―in long-running shareholder litigation over the allocation of initial public 
offerings during the Internet boom of the late 1990s‖). 
 2. John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market:  A Proposal 
to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 861, 864-75 (2005) (―The small businesses that have demonstrated a capacity to 
create a disproportionate amount of the macroeconomic growth, innovation, and net new 
jobs in the United States are the rapid-growth start-ups.‖); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., 
Relaxing the Ban:  It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt 
Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2004) (discussing ability of ―entrepreneurial 
companies that start small and grow fast‖ to create jobs). 
 3. Thomas L. Friedman, Start Up the Risk-Takers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at 10; 
see also, Thomas L. Friedman, Invent, Invent, Invent, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at 8 
(―Lately, there has been way too much talk about minting dollars and too little about 
minting our next Thomas Edison, Bob Noyce, Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Vint Cerf, Jerry Yang, 
Marc Andreessen, Sergey Brin, Bill Joy and Larry Page.‖). 
 4. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 
736 (2010) (―[O]ver half of the states have adopted or considered adopting some form of 
state-sponsored venture capital fund.‖); MICHAEL B. STAEBLER, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANY PROGRAM (2010), 
www.nasbic.org/resource/resmgr/Legal_Issues/pepper_hamilton_overview.pdf (discussing 
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Nonetheless, it remains difficult for entrepreneurs to obtain sufficient 
funding for new high-growth companies (a process this article refers to as 
―startup company finance‖).
5
  There is an expanding ―funding gap‖ 
between the amounts of capital entrepreneurs can raise from personal 
sources such as friends and family (typically below $500,000) and the 
minimum amounts venture capital funds invest (now, typically 
$5,000,000).
6
 
Some of this difficulty is inherent in startups.  These companies and 
their products are unproved.  Even a successful investment in a startup 
company is illiquid and must be held for years.
7
  Most startups fail.
8
 
But these challenges are not insurmountable.  Specific types of 
investors have an appetite for, and a demonstrated ability to manage, these 
risks.  Venture capital funds are the best-understood example.  Financial 
economists and legal scholars have observed for decades that professional 
managers of venture capital funds employ strategies designed to overcome 
the unique risks of startups.
9
 
Only more recently have academics also focused on the investment 
practices of the wealthy individuals, or ―angel investors,‖ who fund these 
companies even before they are ready for venture capital.
10
  Investment 
practices that were once thought to indicate a lack of sophistication or 
bargaining power are now understood as rational responses to the early 
 
federal funding for small businesses); NAT‘L GOVERNORS ASS‘N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, 
STATE STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE ANGEL INVESTMENT FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH (2008), 
available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0802ANGELINVESTMENT.PDF (discussing tax 
credits for investors). 
 5. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 869 (―At the start-up‘s early stages . . . the external funding 
options are typically very limited.‖); Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 3 (―Many emerging 
companies fail to raise critical early-stage capital largely because of market inefficiencies.‖); 
see George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1029, 1032-34 (1992) (describing difficulties startups face obtaining loans and 
accessing public equities markets). 
 6. See Private Equity for Small Firms:  The Importance of the Participating Securities 
Program:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 109th Cong. 37-67 (2005) 
[hereinafter Participating Securities Hearings] (statement of Colin C. Blaydon, Director, 
Center for Private Equity and Entrepreneurship, and Susan L. Preston, Entrepreneur-in-
Residence, Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation); Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 730-31 (noting 
the capacity of venture capital investors to diversify their portfolio of startup investments); 
Orcutt, supra note 2, at 873 (attributing the growing funding gap to higher venture capital 
investment amounts caused by increasing fund sizes). 
 7. See infra text accompanying note 80. 
 8. See infra text accompanying note 24. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 44, 88-99. 
 10. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 1405, 1406-07 (2008) (―Despite their importance, angels are surprisingly 
underappreciated in the popular press and academia, especially legal academia.‖). 
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stage at which angels invest.
11
 
Not only is our understanding of startup company finance evolving—
so are the practices of investors in this market.  Angel investors, for 
example, increasingly collaborate to meet increasing demand for their 
capital.  Long dependent on a personal ―network of trust‖ to locate 
investments,
12
 angel investors are expanding their reach by organizing into 
groups ranging from loose affiliations to more formal structures that 
employ an active manager similar to a venture capital fund.
13
  While these 
groups currently account for a minority of angel investing
14
 (and may not 
be a complete solution to the funding gap),
15
 they are an example of how 
angel investors are adapting to a growing funding gap. 
Unfortunately, securities laws have not kept pace with the evolving 
market for startup company finance, and in fact are an impediment to 
efforts by private actors to close the funding gap.  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission‘s (―SEC‘s‖) current regulations constrain a 
company‘s ability to market its stock directly to investors by prohibiting a 
―general solicitation‖ of securities.
16
  The ban on general solicitation is 
designed to channel sales efforts through regulated intermediaries, such as 
 
 11. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 4 (noting that angel investing has advantages 
over other methods of funding entrepreneurial ventures in non-tech regions); Ibrahim, supra 
note 10 (describing the importance of angel investors in entrepreneurial finance); Brent 
Goldfarb, Gerard Hoberg, David Kirsch & Alexander Triantis, Does Angel Participation 
Matter?  An Analysis of Early Venture Financing (Robert H. Smith Sch. of Bus., Univ. of 
Md., Working Paper No. RHS-06-072, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024186 
(analyzing the constraints and merits of angel investor participation in startup funding); 
Robert Wiltbank, At the Individual Level:  Outlining Angel Investing in the United States 
(Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign‘s Acad. for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical 
Research Reference in Entrepreneurship, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1509255 [hereinafter Wiltbank, At the Individual Level] 
(summarizing empirical research of angel investing within the United States); Robert 
Wiltbank, Investment Practices and Outcomes of Informal Venture Investors, 7 VENTURE 
CAPITAL 343 (2005) [hereinafter Wiltbank, Investment Practices] (comparing formal 
venture capital investment to angel investing). 
 12. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 895 (citing LUCINDA LINDE & ALOK PRASAD, VENTURE 
SUPPORT SYSTEMS PROJECT:  ANGEL INVESTORS 26 (MIT Entrepreneurship Ctr.) (2000)). 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 55-69. 
 14. Ibrahim, supra note 10, at 1443 (―Traditional angel investments still constitute the 
bulk of the angels market.  They account for somewhere between seventy and ninety percent 
of all angel investments.‖). 
 15. Participating Securities Hearings, supra note 6, at 61 (―As yet, no one has created a 
crystal ball which will assure the future of angel capital as an adequate and effective 
resource for the funding gap.  Nor should any intelligent economy rely on one source to 
meet these critical economic needs, just as companies would not single source a crucial part 
of the product.‖); see also Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 742-43 (describing inability of angel 
groups to provide complete funding, but noting the valuable signaling role groups can serve 
for later venture capital investment). 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 147-165. 
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broker-dealers or investment advisers.
17
  While this approach may be 
sensible in other contexts, it has historically produced bad results for 
startups.  The regulatory framework for these conventional intermediaries 
is too cumbersome for early-stage financing,
18
 so high-quality 
intermediaries are not available to startups.  Moreover, the framework for 
regulating intermediaries, based on a snapshot of financial markets in the 
1930s, does not adapt well to the emergence of new intermediary forms.  
This is demonstrated by the need for legislative action to secure favorable 
status for venture capital funds. 
It is not surprising, then, that commentators are questioning the status 
of angel groups under securities regulations, including whether they violate 
the ban on general solicitation or require registration as broker-dealers or 
investment advisers.
19
  To date, these discussions are only scratching the 
surface, noting the potential legal risks but not considering the full range of 
angel groups currently in operation.
20
 
This article argues that angel groups do not violate the ban on general 
solicitation or trigger intermediary registration requirements.  This 
argument recognizes that angel groups—even those that resemble venture 
capital funds by employing an active manager receiving substantial 
compensation—are, at their core, investor-led efforts.  This active-investor 
model should adequately distinguish angel groups from the types of 
intermediaries that securities laws were intended to regulate, and ensures 
that these groups function similarly to other investor-led forums where the 
SEC has relaxed the ban on general solicitation. 
This argument serves two purposes.  One is to ensure that the 
activities of angel groups are not prematurely chilled because a degree of 
legal uncertainty has been identified.  Most of the SEC‘s guidance in this 
area comes in the form of ad hoc no-action letters citing long lists of facts 
and circumstances underlying the SEC‘s decisions.
21
  The logic of these 
 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 161-164. 
 18. See infra text accompanying note 170. 
 19. See Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 753–61 (discussing applicability of the ban on general 
solicitation and broker-dealer regulations to angel groups); Michael T. Raymond, New 
Developments in Raising Private Capital for Early Stage Companies, INST. OF CONTINUING 
LEGAL EDUC., 1 (2004), available at http://www.dickinson-
wright.com/upload_files/BLI%20Presentation%20Outline.pdf (discussing securities 
regulations applicable to angel investor financing of startups). 
 20. See infra note 294 (discussing how actively managed angel groups raise issues that 
are not addressed by Raymond and Ibrahim). 
 21. SEC no-action letters typically include a paragraph stating that the letter represents 
a position regarding enforcement only, does not represent a legal conclusion regarding 
applicability of statutes or regulations, and is based on the specific facts presented.  
Nonetheless, they are often relied on in the absence of other authority.  See Orcutt, supra 
note 2 (discussing the role of no-action letters in formulating securities laws).   
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letters is hard to discern, making it difficult to analogize to new 
developments like angel groups.  But by looking broadly at the principles 
underlying a wide variety of private offering regulations, rather than 
myopically at some unfavorable elements in relevant SEC interpretations, 
persuasive arguments emerge for why current regulations can 
accommodate a wide range of angel group forms. 
The second reason for analyzing angel groups under current law is to 
highlight broader problems with existing regulatory frameworks by 
demonstrating how difficult it is to discern a coherent conceptual 
framework from existing laws.  Concepts such as whether a ―general 
solicitation‖ of investors has occurred and whether intermediaries receive 
―transaction-based compensation‖ are key to whether angel groups comply 
with securities laws.  But these concepts are poorly defined by courts and 
regulators, making them difficult to apply to new practices and leaving 
substantial room for reaching a different conclusion than is reached in this 
article.  Besides being indeterminate, as we better understand how angel 
investors effectively fend for themselves, these ethereal concepts appear 
increasingly irrelevant to the overarching purpose of protecting investors. 
This article concludes with a reform proposal.  The reform would 
relax the ban on general solicitation and intermediary registration 
requirements in circumstances where angel investors have demonstrated an 
ability to protect themselves.  In doing so, it would provide not only more 
certainty with respect to current practices, but also more flexibility to allow 
future innovations that could close the funding gap. 
I. MARKET PARTICIPANTS 
Traditional participants in startup company finance include startup 
companies, venture capital funds, and individual angel investors.  In recent 
years, angel groups have also gained popularity.  This part includes a brief 
description of these market participants as context for the discussion that 
follows. 
A. Startup Companies 
A startup company is a new venture with an innovative product or 
business model that targets rapid growth.  This definition distinguishes 
startup companies from ―livelihood businesses,‖ which generate income for 
the company founders and employees, but lack significant prospects for 
generating large returns to outside investors through an initial public 
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offering of stock (―IPO‖), or by being acquired.
22
  Successful startup 
companies include Microsoft, Google, and Starbucks, but the category also 
includes failures, including many dot-com bubble victims.
23
 
Statistically, a startup company will probably fail.  Even considering 
only those companies that obtain funding, approximately two-thirds do not 
generate positive returns to investors.
24
 
B. VC Funds 
―Venture capital‖ means a pool of professionally managed funds 
provided by passive investors for investment in startup companies.  This 
article uses the term ―VC investors‖ to refer to the investors who provide 
capital, ―VC managers‖ to refer to the entities and individuals who choose 
and monitor investments on behalf of the fund, and ―VC funds‖ to  refer 
collectively to the VC investors, the pool of capital, and the VC managers.  
Legally, a VC fund is typically a limited partnership with the VC investors 
as the limited partners and an entity formed by the VC managers as the 
general partner.
25
 
1. Professional Intermediaries 
VC managers are financial intermediaries.
26
  They engage in a 
―venture capital cycle‖ of raising capital, deploying it by making 
investments, distributing returns to investors, and launching new funds.
27
 
 VC managers are a unique form of intermediary because they have an 
intensive and long-term role in monitoring investments.  In contrast, many 
intermediaries have little or no ongoing role after an initial investment is 
made.  Examples are stockbrokers, who help execute or recommend trades 
of stock listed on a stock exchange,
28
 and underwriters, who market and sell 
 
 22. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 862 (distinguishing livelihood businesses from ―rapid-
growth startups‖). 
 23. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside:  Preferred Stock & 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 891 n.1 (2002) (―In the first seven months of 
2001, 367 internet companies went out of business, and nearly 83,000 dot-com employees 
were laid off.‖). 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 115-121. 
 25. MICHAEL J. HALLORAN ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 
1-7 (3d ed. 1999) (providing template of venture capital limited partnership agreement). 
 26. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 888-90; George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in 
the World of Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 307-19 (2001) (comparing 
VC managers and banks as financial intermediaries). 
 27. See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2d 
ed. 2004) (explaining the cycle of venture capital fundraising and investment). 
 28. See Cutting Through the Confusion:  Where to Turn for Help with Your 
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securities to investors in an IPO.
29
 
There are other intermediaries who, like VC managers, have ongoing 
management responsibilities for a pool of funds or portfolio of investments.  
Examples are:  hedge fund managers, who typically make and manage 
investments in publicly traded stock, commodities, and related 
derivatives;
30
 mutual fund managers, who make and manage investments in 
publicly traded stocks and bonds;
31
 and traditional investment advisers (or 
―wealth managers‖), who manage an investment account for a specific 
person or entity.
32
  These fund or account managers, however, often 
manage a portfolio of relatively liquid investments with ascertainable 
market values, so their performance can be evaluated somewhat regularly, 
and the relationship between the investor and the intermediary can be 
terminated (by liquidation of the account or redemption by the fund) at 
regular intervals.
33
  VC investors, in contrast, are typically committed to the 
fund for its duration because the investments are long-term and illiquid.
34
  
The monitoring role of VC managers is also unique because they are 
actively involved in the operations of the companies in which they invest.
35
  
Hedge fund managers and mutual fund managers do not generally play an 
active management role in portfolio companies because the investments 
that they facilitate are typically passive.
36
 
The standard fee arrangement for VC managers reflects its intensive 
monitoring role and the long-term nature of the investments the managers 
 
Investments, COAL. ON INVESTOR EDUC.,  available at 
http://www.nasaa.org/content/getsearchablefile.cfm?FamilyID=5583&filename=CuttingThr
oughTheConfusion.pdf [hereinafter Cutting Through the Confusion] (comparing investment 
advisers and stockbrokers). 
 29. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 885-86 (discussing underwriters as intermediaries). 
 30. SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 1 (2005) (―Hedge Fund‖ 
has no uniformly accepted meaning, but commonly refers to a professionally managed pool 
of assets used to invest and trade in equity securities, fixed-income securities, derivatives, 
futures and other financial instruments.‖). 
 31. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 887-88 (describing mutual funds as ―collectivizing 
agent[s]‖ for shareholders). 
 32. See Cutting Through the Confusion, supra note 28 (summarizing the roles and 
duties of common forms of investment advisers). 
 33. See, e.g., SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, supra note 30, at 3 (stating that hedge fund 
investors are typically permitted to withdraw on a quarterly basis). 
 34. See HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 1-130 to -133 (including VC partnership 
agreement limiting rights of withdrawal). 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 92-94 (describing board and control rights of 
VC funds). 
 36. Activist hedge funds are an exception to this rule.  They purchase a stake in an 
underperforming publicly traded company and press management for changes.  See 
generally April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism:  Hedge 
Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187 (2009) (examining recent trends in 
shareholder activism). 
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facilitate.  The fee typically has two components:  a management fee equal 
to approximately 2.5% of assets under management,
37
 and a ―carried 
interest‖ typically equal to 20% of gains realized by the fund on 
investments.
38
  The management fee covers the cost of actively monitoring 
investments, while the carried interest aligns the long-term incentives of the 
VC investors and manager. 
2. Institutional Capital 
VC investors are largely sophisticated, institutional investors.  
Approximately two-thirds of VC investors are pension funds, endowments, 
or foundations.
39
 
3. Geography 
VC funds are headquartered in a handful of geographic hot spots, most 
notably Silicon Valley and the Route 128 area near Boston.  California 
VC funds accounted for over $84 billion of the approximately $200 billion 
under management by VC firms in 2008, and Massachusetts VC funds 
accounted for an additional $36 billion.
40
 
VC funds are not only headquartered in select areas, but also 
concentrate their investments in companies located in those areas.  Nearly 
half of the total dollar value of 2008 VC investments went to companies 
located in California.  That year, VC funds invested over $1 billion of 
VC capital in each of California, Massachusetts, Texas, Washington, and 
New York, accounting for over two-thirds of all VC investments.
41
  
Alternatively, six states and territories received from zero to $1 million in 
 
 37. See HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 1-51, 1-108 (providing VC partnership agreement 
with management fees based on net asset value and committed capital); Ibrahim supra 
note 4, at 733 n.63 (―The management fee is typically two percent of the risk capital in the 
venture fund . . . .‖); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-
Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 491 (1990) (finding that over 50% of surveyed 
VC fund agreements include management fee equal to 2.5% of committed capital). 
 38. HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 1-51; see also Sahlman, supra note 37, at 491 (finding 
that 88% of surveyed VC fund agreements provide VC managers with 20% of gains). 
 39. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital 
Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 157 n.86 (2003) (citing statistics from the National Venture 
Capital Association‘s 2002 Yearbook); Sahlman, supra note 37, at 488 (reporting that in 
1988, 64% of venture capital came from pension funds, endowments, and insurance 
companies). 
 40. NAT‘L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS‘N, 2009 VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 
17 (2009), available at 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=446&Item
id=464 [hereinafter 2009 YEARBOOK]. 
 41. Id. at 25-27. 
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total VC funding in 2008.
42
 
4. A Mature Industry 
Although VC financing in its current form is relatively new compared 
to traditional bank financing and the public equities market, the 
VC industry is highly organized and well studied.  For example, 
VC managers and their professional advisers formed a trade association 
named the National Venture Capital Association (―NVCA‖).  Through the 
NVCA website,
43
 one can readily access model legal documents for 
VC financings that are intended to reflect customary terms.  Study of 
VC investment practices is facilitated by an annual ―Yearbook‖ published 
by the NVCA that includes statistics dating back to 1980.  Key features of 
the VC industry and VC investment practices discussed in this article have 
been observed in law reviews or economic journals for decades.
44
 
C. Angel Investors 
Startup companies cannot rely entirely on VC funds for financing, 
particularly in earlier stages, when funding requests are below minimum 
VC investment amounts.  As a result, entrepreneurs often turn to individual 
angel investors. 
In simple terms, angel investors are wealthy individuals who are not 
family members or personal friends of a company‘s founders.  As 
described below, they differ from VC funds in several key respects. 
1. Separate and Direct Investment 
Angel investors generally do not rely on intermediaries, such as 
broker-dealers, to identify or manage investments.
45
  While angel investors 
increasingly organize into groups and may ultimately invest through a 
collective entity (for example, an LLC), more often than not, each angel 
investor participating in a round of financing by a startup company makes a 
separate investment.
46
  A significant angel round often involves ten or more 
 
 42. Id. at 26. 
 43. NAT‘L VENTURE CAPITAL. ASS‘N, http://www.nvca.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2010). 
 44. See generally Sahlman, supra note 37 (describing customary VC terms during the 
1980s). 
 45. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 926-27 (discussing why a viable market for private 
placement intermediaries does not exist). 
 46. See Ibrahim, supra note 14 (noting the prominence of traditional angel investors in 
the angels market). 
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separate investors.
47
 
This traditional model of individual angel investment can be 
inefficient.  Instead of negotiating with one intermediary, a startup 
company seeking angel investment must negotiate, communicate, and 
contract with ten or more separate investors.  The parties can mitigate these 
inefficiencies by designating an informal ―lead‖ investor through whom 
negotiations are conducted on behalf of other more passive angel 
investors.
48
  But the effectiveness of a lead investor is limited by its lack of 
formal authority to act on behalf of each investor. 
2. Wealth and Experience 
On average, angel investors are wealthy and have experience with 
entrepreneurial ventures.  In a recent study of angel investors, Professor 
Robert Wiltbank found that the investors had founded on average three 
ventures over 13 years.
49
  Wiltbank also found that angel investors, while 
not full-time professional investors like VC managers, did invest in startups 
frequently.  He found that angel investors averaged nine investments in 
startup companies over ten years and held an average of $1.3 million of 
investments spread over six ventures at the time of the study.
50
 
The term ―angel investor,‖ however, is sufficiently broad to 
encompass a wide range of investors.  People who have inherited wealth 
and non-financial professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, commonly 
invest in startup companies and are fairly included within the definition of 
angel investors.
51
 
3. Geography 
Angel investors are even less likely than VC funds to invest outside of 
their local area.
52
  As discussed below, angel investors rely on personal 
 
 47. See Goldfarb et al., supra note 11, at 10-11 (finding an average of 12.8 angel 
investors per financing); Andrew Y. Wong, Angel Finance:  The Other Venture Capital 23 
(SSRN Working Paper Series, 2002) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=941228 (finding an average of 12 angel 
investors per financing). 
 48. See Ibrahim, supra note 10, at 1424 n.89 (recognizing the important role lead 
investors play in bringing investment opportunities to co-investors); Orcutt, supra note 2, at 
879 (noting problems that create inefficiency in the angel market). 
 49. Wiltbank, At the Individual Level, supra note 11, at 3. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 877. 
 52. See Brent Goldfarb, Gerard Hoberg, David Kirsch & Alexander Triantis, Does 
Angel Participation Matter?  An Analysis of Early Venture Financing, at 11 (2008), 
available at 
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networks to locate investment opportunities, and those networks are likely 
to be concentrated in the areas where the angel investors live.
53
 
Overall, angel investing is probably less concentrated in high-tech 
hubs than VC investing, with angel networks or groups emerging all over 
the country.  But areas with significant VC activity are likely to produce 
more ex-entrepreneurs, and therefore produce more potential angel 
investors.
54
 
D. Angel Groups 
Angel groups are not altogether new to the angel investing scene, but 
they have proliferated in recent years.  The number of angel groups 
increased from an estimated 10 in 1996 to an estimated 200  by 2003.
55
  In 
2009, there were approximately 300 angel groups in the U.S.
56
 
There is a great deal of variation in the organizational form of angel 
groups.  As described below, angel groups differ in how investment 
decisions are made, the degree to which they rely on professional 
managers, and their legal structure.  The organizational characteristics of 
angel groups can be understood as lying along a continuum, with a loose 
affiliation of investors sharing investment opportunities on one end, and a 
pooled investment vehicle with paid and active managers on the other end.  
At the latter end of the continuum, angel groups appear similar in form to 
VC funds. 
1. Investment Decision 
Members of an angel group may decide to invest on an individual 
basis after presentation of the investment opportunity to the group.  
 
http://www1.american.edu/academic.depts/ksb/finance_realestate/rhauswald/seminar/angels
_napa.pdf (finding that investors are more likely to invest in their own zip code in angel-
only deals than in deals involving VC funds). 
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 130-136 (arguing that reliance on personal 
networks improves angel investing outcomes). 
 54. See Wong, supra note 47, at 10 (finding a correlation between the location of 
venture capital investments and angel investing within several geographic areas of the 
United States). 
 55. SUSAN L. PRESTON, ANGEL INVESTMENT GROUPS, NETWORKS, AND FUNDS:  A 
GUIDEBOOK TO DEVELOPING THE RIGHT ANGEL ORGANIZATION FOR YOUR COMMUNITY 1 
(2004). 
 56. See ANGEL CAPITAL ASS‘N, FAQ:  THE VALUE OF ANGEL INVESTORS AND ANGEL 
GROUPS (2009), available at 
http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/data/Documents/Public%20Policy/Federal%20/Valu
e%20of%20Angels%20FAQ%202009R.pdf (stating that the Angel Capital Education 
Foundation lists 300 U.S. angel groups in its database). 
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Alternatively, members of the group may make investment decisions on a 
collective basis, for example, by majority vote of members or through an 
elected investment committee.  In a 2003 survey of angel groups by the 
Center for Venture Research (the ―CVR study‖), 70% of respondents 
indicated that their members made investment decisions individually, 23% 
by majority vote, and 7% through an investment committee.
57
 
Involvement of the group members in making investment decisions is 
contrary to the passive role that investors play in VC funds.  For a 
VC investor, the manager‘s expertise in selecting investments is a primary 
appeal of the investment vehicle.  Angel group members, on the other hand, 
frequently report that they participate in groups to improve their ability to 
make investment decisions by learning from other group members.
58
  Even 
in a group that relies on a paid manager, the members typically participate 
in key points of the investment process, including due diligence 
investigations of the companies that make presentations to the group.
59
  
This active investment model distinguishes an angel group from a small 
VC fund.
60
 
2. Separate or Collective Investment 
Closely related to the question of how investment decisions are made 
is the question of whether members of the group invest collectively or 
separately.  When group members make individual investment decisions, 
each member may be individually responsible for negotiating the terms of, 
and monitoring, his or her individual investment.  When groups invest by 
majority vote or by the decision of an investment committee, group 
members are likely to make a single collective investment through an entity 
such as an LLC.  Angel group members may pool funds for the purpose of 
making multiple investments within a single collective investment vehicle 
(like a VC fund), or they may pool funds on an investment-by-investment 
basis, such as by forming an LLC for each company in which the group 
invests.
61
 
 
 57. See PRESTON, supra note 55, at 58. 
 58. Id. at 7 (noting that the top two reasons angels invest through groups are ―[t]he 
opportunity to co-invest with other, more experienced investors‖ and ―[t]he opportunity to 
learn from successful business angels‖). 
 59. Id. at 39 (noting that in manager-led groups, ―[m]embers are involved at various 
levels depending on their interests, market or industry expertise, and general desire‖ and 
―[m]embers often assist the manager or can lead functional efforts in strategic planning, 
member relations, or investment identification and selection‖). 
 60. Id. at 6 (noting that VC funds operate on a passive investor model where individuals 
are ―not actively involved in the investment decision-making process‖). 
 61. Id. at 29-30. 
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3. Management 
Angel groups vary in the degree to which they rely on paid managers.  
In the CVR study, 61% of respondents reported having paid professional 
staff.
62
  Both the role of paid staff and the way in which they are 
compensated, however, vary significantly among angel groups. 
In some cases, staff may play a purely administrative role by, for 
example, coordinating member communications, planning meetings, and 
managing the group‘s website and intake procedure for submitting 
entrepreneurs.
63
  This article refers to organizations with this type of 
administrative staff, together with organizations that have no paid staff and 
that rely entirely on member volunteers, as ―volunteer-based groups.‖ 
At the other end of the continuum, an angel group manager may be 
actively involved in a wide variety of functions that appear similar to a 
VC manager, with the significant distinction that an angel group manager 
does not make investment decisions.  An active angel group manager might 
screen portfolio company applicants to identify strong candidates and 
eliminate others from consideration, provide coaching to presenting 
companies, assist in conducting due diligence for possible investments, and 
negotiate investment terms on behalf of the group.
64
  This article refers to 
angel groups that rely more heavily on a paid manager as ―actively 
managed groups.‖ 
The administrative staff of a volunteer-based group is likely to receive 
a relatively modest cash fee that can be funded from member dues, fees 
collected from presenting companies, and possibly sponsorships from local 
service providers or other sources.
65
  On the other hand, the manager of an 
actively managed group may receive compensation that is akin to that 
received by a VC manager, including a management fee equal to a 
percentage of committed funds and a carried interest equal to a percentage 
of any positive return on the investments.
66
 
4. Legal Structure 
The legal structure of an angel group depends on the angel group 
 
 62. Id. at 17. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 17, 44. 
 65. See id. at 38 (discussing sources of revenues to cover administrative support for 
volunteer-based groups). 
 66. See id. at 24 (citing Washington Dinner Club as an example of an actively managed 
group that compensates its manager through a management fee and 15% carried interest); id. 
at 39 (indicating that a management fee equal to 2-3% of committed capital and carried 
interest is typical compensation for an actively managed group). 
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characteristics discussed above.  For example, if the members will rely on 
managers for purely administrative functions and investors will invest 
either individually or through an LLC formed for a single investment, the 
group can be structured as a nonprofit corporation.  An executive director 
can handle operational matters, and administrative staff can be employed 
by the nonprofit organization.
67
 
If the group‘s manager will have a more active role and will, 
accordingly, receive a percentage of committed funds and a carried interest, 
it is more typical to structure the group as an LLC.
68
  This allows for 
collection of management fees from investors‘ contributions to the LLC 
and creation of a carried interest in the LLC‘s operating agreement. 
No single organizational structure dominates the angel group 
landscape.  In the CVR study, 44% of respondents were organized as 
nonprofit organizations, 38% as LLCs, 9% as corporations, and 7% as 
informal affiliations without a legal entity.
69
 
II. THE CHALLENGES OF STARTUP COMPANY FINANCE 
It is a widely held belief that startup companies do not have sufficient 
funding sources.
70
  This belief is usually expressed in terms of the widening 
―funding gap‖ between the amount of capital that a typical entrepreneur can 
raise from personal resources and the minimum amount that VC funds are 
willing to invest.  Fifteen years ago, the funding gap was believed to range 
from approximately $500,000, the point at which friends and family 
funding was likely exhausted, to $2 million, the minimum amount that 
VC funds would then typically invest.
71
  But the size of VC funds has 
increased; thus, they have incentives to deploy their capital more efficiently 
by making larger investments.
72
  Currently, VC funds do not often make 
investments below $5 million.
73
 
 
 67. See id. at 20-21 (indicating that a nonprofit structure facilitates the hiring of angel 
group staff). 
 68. See id. at 35 (indicating that nearly all respondents to the CVR study who reported 
covering costs by a percentage of committed capital were LLCs and that LLCs are the 
predominant legal form of angel funds). 
 69. Id. at 26. 
 70. One source estimates $60 billion annually in ―unmet need for early-stage equity 
financing.‖  Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 3, 6 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-00-190, SMALL BUSINESS:  EFFORTS TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 
1, 2 (2000)). 
 71. Participating Securities Hearings, supra note 6, at 54 (statement of Susan L. 
Preston, Director of Attorney Training and Professional Development, Davis Wright 
Tremaine). 
 72. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 873-74. 
 73. Participating Securities Hearings, supra note 6, at 54. 
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Some commentators also describe a geographic funding gap due to 
geographic clustering of VC activity.  They believe this leaves 
entrepreneurs outside those areas without adequate funding opportunities.
74
 
It is beyond this article‘s scope to conclude whether startup companies 
are in fact underfunded in any absolute sense.  The availability of capital 
for startup companies and returns to investors in startup companies 
fluctuate over time.
75
  What can be said with confidence is that investing in 
startup companies involves unique challenges. 
A. Poor Candidates for Traditional Financing 
Because startup companies typically develop new products, they 
require substantial capital for research and development activities and 
expect to direct any cash flow generated in early years of operations to 
these efforts.  Moreover, the assets of a typical startup company primarily 
consist of intellectual property relating to an unproven product, making the 
assets difficult to value and highly illiquid.  These factors typically prevent 
startup companies from meeting the underwriting requirements of 
traditional lenders because they lack both cash flow to service debt and 
satisfactory assets to secure repayment.
76
 
B. Uncertainty, Information Asymmetry, and Agency Costs 
Because startup companies are new ventures operating outside of 
established markets, investing in them involves substantial uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and agency costs.  These costs limit the pool of 
investors willing to invest in startups and increase the cost of capital to the 
entrepreneur. 
Uncertainty is inherent in startup companies because their innovative 
products and business plans are untested at the time of investment.
77
  An 
entrepreneur will typically have a business plan laying out a strategy for 
developing and marketing its products, but the plan can be based only on 
 
 74. Id. at 41-42. 
 75. In the last decade, the rolling five-year average internal rate of return for VC funds 
ranged from approximately 48% to 6.5%.  2009 YEARBOOK, supra note 40, at 52.  Over that 
period, the capital committed to VC funds ranged from over $100 billion to less than $10 
billion.  Id. at 19. 
 76. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 869-70. 
 77. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market:  Lessons from the 
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1068, 1076-77 (2003) (noting that the success of a 
startup company is in large part determined by decisions that have yet to be made, 
management that has yet to demonstrate its quality, and a technology base that adds 
scientific uncertainty). 
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the entrepreneur‘s best guess about how the products will be received by 
potential customers and the costs and challenges of establishing the 
business.  Major strategic decisions, such as how to spend company funds, 
when to seek additional funding, and when to sell or close down the 
business are necessarily left unmade at the time of funding. 
―Information asymmetry‖ refers to the concept that whatever 
information is available about the company‘s prospects at the time of the 
investment is ―soft‖ (not easily observable by an investor and difficult for 
an entrepreneur to communicate credibly).  In other words, there is an 
imbalance of information in favor of the entrepreneur.  In the face of 
information asymmetry, an investor will have a difficult time 
distinguishing between good and bad investments and will discount all the 
opportunities or price them all as mediocre, thereby raising the cost of 
capital for high-quality entrepreneurs.
78
 
Potential agency costs incurred by investors post-funding also raise 
the cost of capital to the entrepreneur.  Agency costs are a result of 
uncertainty about the venture and arise because ―parties cannot control 
post-financing behavior by contract because either the behavior itself or 
future states of the world cannot be verified by third-party arbiters.‖
79
  This 
means either the entrepreneur or the investors will have discretion over 
major future decisions and the opportunity to exercise that discretion in a 
way that maximizes personal benefits at the expense of the venture.  The 
classic example is the entrepreneur who continues to operate a company 
that would optimally be sold (either because a positive exit is possible or in 
order to avoid additional losses) because of personal benefits such as salary 
or the prestige of running the business. 
C. Patient Capital 
Investments in startup companies are illiquid.  There is no ready 
market for private company stock, and before an exit event, such as an IPO 
or sale of the company, there is no easy way to value these investments.  As 
a result, an investor in a startup company can expect to wait more than five 
years for any return on the investment.
80
 
D. Public Funding Programs Struggle 
Addressing the funding gap has emerged as a major public policy 
 
 78. Triantis, supra note 26, at 307. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Wiltbank, Investment Practices, supra note 11, at 16 (finding an average 
holding period of 5.8 years for successful angel investments). 
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initiative at multiple levels of government.  A number of government 
programs seek to subsidize or otherwise ―engineer‖
81
 a market for early-
stage finance, but this task has proved difficult. 
For example, many states provide tax credits to angel investors.  Yet it 
has been observed that investors in startup companies are not especially 
sensitive to tax consequences, perhaps because of their ―home-run 
mentality‖ (i.e., their appetite for investments that are likely to be either 
total losses or spectacular successes).
82
  It has also been asserted that these 
tax credits largely benefit investors who would invest without them and are 
essentially a windfall to these existing investors without any resulting 
public benefit.
83
 
State governments also maintain programs for investment of public 
funds in local startups.  These programs may take the form of direct 
investment in startup companies, investment in VC funds committed to 
funding local companies, or matching funds for local angel groups.
84
  After 
more than a decade, these efforts have produced mixed results.
85
 
At the federal level, public investment in startup companies has 
historically occurred through small business investment companies 
(―SBICs‖), which are investment vehicles that are operated by private 
management companies to deploy a combination of private capital and 
funds from the federal government.  Until 2005, the Small Business 
Administration (―SBA‖) operated a Participating Securities Program that 
was specially designed to facilitate investment in startup companies.  In 
2004, the federal government ceased licensing new Participating Securities 
SBICs because the program was expected to result in losses of $2.7 billion 
on $6 billion of federal funding.
86
 
 
 81. See generally Gilson, supra note 77, at 1069 (using the word, engineer, to describe 
efforts to duplicate Silicon Valley). 
 82. Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
1737, 1764-65 (1994) (noting, but ultimately dismissing, this explanation for why startup 
companies are structured as potentially tax-inefficient C-corporations). 
 83. NAT‘L GOVERNORS ASS‘N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 9. 
 84. For example, the Oregon Growth Account invests funds from the Oregon state 
lottery in VC funds, and at least one angel group structured as a fund, with the intention that 
those funds will invest in Oregon startups.  Boards and Commissions:  Oregon Growth 
Account Board, OFF. ST. TREASURER, http://www.ost.state.or.us/About/OGA (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2010). 
 85. Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 16. 
 86. Participating Securities Hearings, supra note 6, at 33-36 (Statement of Hector V. 
Baretto, Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration); STAEBLER, supra note 4, at 1-
4. 
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III. MARKET RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGES OF FUNDING STARTUP 
COMPANIES 
The above discussion of the funding gap invites the question why 
anyone would invest in startup companies, but in fact VC funds and angel 
investors invest an estimated $40 billion annually.
87
  This part provides a 
brief summary of prevailing explanations for how VC funds and angel 
investors navigate the challenges of investing in startup companies. 
A. Key Features of VC Financings 
1. Preferred Stock 
The use of convertible preferred stock in VC financing transactions 
has been described as ubiquitous.  Approximately 95% of VC financings 
are in the form of convertible preferred stock.
88
 
The use of convertible preferred stock sets the financial terms of the 
VC investment.  The terms of preferred stock are negotiated by the parties 
and do vary somewhat, but a number of key features are almost always 
present:  a liquidation preference equal to at least the amount invested that 
is triggered upon certain events such as a dissolution, merger, or sale of the 
company, rights to convert the preferred stock into common stock at the 
investor‘s option, and adjustments to conversion rights that protect the 
investor from the adverse economic effects that could occur if the company 
later sells stock at a lower price than the investor paid (referred to as 
―dilution‖).
89
 
Economists believe that these key features of preferred stock create 
financial incentives that mitigate uncertainty, information asymmetry, and 
agency costs.  For example, the VC fund‘s liquidation preference is a 
hurdle that the entrepreneur must clear before sharing in the economic 
successes of the company.  This hurdle makes preferred stock ―unattractive 
to low-quality entrepreneurs‖ because they will be unsure of their ability to 
clear the hurdle.
90
  By agreeing to the liquidation preference for the 
 
 87. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 876-77 (discussing the amount of angel investment in 
2002, 2003, and 2004 based on statistics from The Center for Venture Research 
(approximately $21 billion annually) and the amount of VC investment in 2002 based on 
information from Thomson Venture Economics (approximately $21 billion)). 
 88. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure:  A 
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 879 (2003). 
 89. For example, these terms are reflected in the National Venture Capital Association‘s 
model term sheet.  NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASS‘N, Term Sheet, 
http://www2.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=75&Item
id=93 (last updated Feb. 2010). 
 90. Gilson & Schizer, supra note 88, at 887 (explaining the signaling theory but 
questioning whether it is a complete explanation); see also Orcutt, supra note 2, at 893 
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VC fund, but accepting common stock for themselves, entrepreneurs may 
be signaling their confidence in their abilities and the business opportunity, 
thereby reducing uncertainty and information asymmetry. 
Signaling theory is just a sample of the many explanations by financial 
economists and legal scholars for why preferred stock is standard in startup 
company financings.
91
 
2. Strong Control Rights 
a. Board Representation 
 
It is typical for a VC fund to control at least a substantial minority of a 
portfolio company‘s board.
92
  Board representation mitigates agency costs.  
It provides the VC investor with a monitoring role, while leaving 
responsibility for day-to-day operations in the hands of the managers (the 
entrepreneurs), who have superior access to information.
93
 
b. Protective Covenants 
VC investment contracts typically include a variety of protective 
covenants that respond to the challenges of startup company finance.  For 
example, investors may have the right to cause the company to register its 
stock with the SEC and stock exchanges in order to mitigate illiquidity.  
Investors may also have the right to buy a portion of any stock offered by 
the company in the future.  This serves to protect against later financings at 
a lower price that would dilute the investors‘ stake, thereby mitigating 
pricing uncertainty.
94
 
3. Staging Investments 
VC funds typically stage their investment in a startup company, 
meaning that they invest in multiple installments or tranches spread over 
 
(identifying preferred stock as a mechanism by which VC funds mitigate agency costs). 
 91. E.g., Triantis, supra note 26, at 317-19 (indicating that convertible preferred stock 
addresses uncertainty and information asymmetry by deferring the decision between rights 
associated with debt and rights associated with equity and mitigates agency costs because 
ordinary debt would cause the company to be highly leveraged and would therefore invite 
risky behavior by the entrepreneur). 
 92. Dent, supra note 5, at 1037-39; Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company:  
A Contractarian Rebuttal to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 65 TENN. 
L. REV. 79, 107 (1997). 
 93. See Triantis, supra note 26, at 316 (explaining that the entrepreneur is the best party 
to exploit flexibility in reacting to new information). 
 94. Dent, supra note 5, at 1038-65. 
CABLEFINALIZED_THREE 1/23/2011  1:47 PM 
126 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:1 
  
time.  In some cases, each tranche is tied to achievement of a specified 
milestone.
95
  Staging investments mitigates information asymmetry and 
uncertainty by allowing the VC fund to delay a portion of its investment 
until it has more information about the company‘s prospects.  It also 
encourages the entrepreneur to earn the next tranche of funding and 
therefore mitigates agency costs by discouraging opportunistic behavior.
96
 
4. Syndication 
VC funds often invest alongside each other in a particular transaction, 
with one fund serving as the ―lead‖ investor with primary responsibility for 
due diligence and negotiating investment terms.
97
  Syndication of 
investments provides a ―second set of eyes‖ on the investment.
98
  
Syndication also increases deal flow (i.e., the number of investment 
opportunities available for consideration by each VC fund) and therefore 
helps diversify each fund‘s investments to mitigate risk.
99
 
B. Key Features of Angel Financings Compared 
The investment practices of angel investors are not as well understood 
as those of VC funds.  For one, angel investors are difficult to study.
100
  The 
failure to identify strong conventions among angel investors is not merely a 
question of research methodology, however.  It also likely reflects the fact 
that angel investment practices are in fact more varied than those of 
VC funds.
101
 
Nonetheless, financial economists and legal scholars have been paying 
increased attention to angel investment practices in recent years, and a 
clearer picture of those practices is emerging.  As discussed below, these 
studies indicate that angel investors obtain investment terms that are similar 
to, but ultimately weaker than, the terms received by VC funds. 
 
 95. Ibrahim, supra note 10, at 1411-12; Orcutt, supra note 2, at 891-92. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Wiltbank, Investment Practices, supra note 11, at 6-7. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Ibrahim, supra note 10, at n.20. 
 100. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 876 (―Because of the informal and fragmented nature of the 
U.S. angel market, it is difficult to get specific data on the angel market, or its individual 
investors.‖). 
 101. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 878 (―The due diligence process conducted by angels, and 
the financing terms and conditions they agree to, vary dramatically from one angel to 
another.‖). 
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1. Weaker but Similar Cash-Flow Rights 
It is often stated that angel investors are more likely to invest in 
common than preferred stock.
102
  Recent studies, however, suggest that this 
perception is no longer accurate (if it ever was).  A study based on the 
records of the now-defunct law firm of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, 
for example, found that ―angels almost always take preferred shares . . . 
either investing alone or alongside VC[] [investors].‖
103
  Model term sheets 
for angel-type investments also suggest that preferred stock is typical.
104
 
Although angel investors usually receive preferred stock, the cash-
flow rights associated with that stock are likely to be weaker than those 
associated with the stock typically issued to a VC fund.  For example, the 
Brobeck study showed that angel investors are less likely to receive 
cumulative dividend rights,
105
 participating preferred stock,
106
 redemption 
rights,
107
 and the most beneficial forms of antidilution protections.
108
 
2. Weaker Control Rights 
Angel investors also typically receive weaker control rights than 
VC funds.  For example, angel investors are less likely to have board 
representation.
109
 
 
 102. E.g., Ibrahim, supra note 10, at 1422. 
 103. Goldfarb et al., supra note 11, at 3. 
 104. E.g., PRESTON, supra note 55, at app. 11. 
 105. Goldfarb et al., supra note 11, at 12.  The preferred stock issued by startups rarely 
pays cash dividends.  But it sometimes provides for a cumulative dividend that accrues, but 
is not paid, over the life of the investment in order to increase the VC fund‘s liquidation 
preference. 
 106. Id.  Participating preferred stock entitles the investor to receive not only a 
liquidation preference equal to the purchase price, but also an additional share of proceeds 
that would otherwise go to holders of common stock.  It is considered a particularly 
investor-friendly term because it allows the investor to ―double-dip‖ if an event occurs that 
triggers the liquidation preference. 
 107. Id. at 16.  Redemption rights are strong cash-flow rights that also have a substantial 
control function because exercise of such a right may effectively shut down an 
underperforming company. 
 108. Wong, supra note 47, at 20 (finding that angels receive antidilution protection less 
often than VC investors, and are less likely to receive ―full ratchet‖ protection than 
VC investors). 
 109. Id. at 15 (indicating that board representation was given in only 42.5% of angel 
financings); Ibrahim, supra note 10, at 1423 (citing a study indicating that angel investors in 
software companies had board representation in only 20% of deals (citing John Freear & 
Jeffrey Sohl, The Characteristics and Value-Added Contributions of Private Investors to 
Entrepreneurial Software Ventures, 6 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 84, 96 (2001))); see also 
Goldfarb et al., supra note 11, at 17 (indicating that angel-only financings cede 17% to 20% 
greater board control to common shareholders than VC deals). 
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Protective covenants are even more rare in angel financings.  For 
example, one study reported that covenants requiring investor approval of 
certain actions by management were found in only 5% of angel deals.
110
 
3. Limited Ability to Stage Investment 
Angel investors do not typically stage their investments.
111
 Individual 
angels investing their own funds typically have less ability to make follow-
on investments than a VC fund engaged in a continuous fundraising cycle. 
C. Angel Investing Outcomes 
Judging from the discussion above, one might fairly expect that angel 
investors do not fare well in their investments.  They face the same (or 
worse) problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs 
as VC funds, but they do not receive the same protections.  Yet, two recent 
studies by financial economists indicate that angel investors and VC funds 
achieve similar investment results. 
Wiltbank tracked investment results among angel investors through 
surveys of participants in angel groups.  He found that nearly two-thirds of 
angel investment exits resulted in negative returns and that 19% resulted in 
positive returns.  Wiltbank observes that this distribution of outcomes is 
comparable to studies of VC investments on a project basis (i.e., tracking 
performance of each portfolio company rather than overall fund 
performance).
112
  Overall, Wiltbank estimates an average rate of return of 
10% per angel investor
113
 and a cash-to-cash multiple of 2.9, a result that 
Wiltbank describes as ―respectable.‖
114
  Wiltbank‘s survey results suggest 
that angel investing is risky, but on average may be ―worth it.‖
115
 
The Brobeck study considered outcomes for financings involving 
angel investors only, both angel investors and VC funds, and VC funds 
only.
116
  The study found that 31% of companies included in the study were 
successful (experienced successful liquidity events such as merger or IPO), 
28% were surviving (some indication of continued operation but no 
successful liquidity event), and the remaining 41% had failed (no indication 
 
 110. Ibrahim, supra note 10, at 1423. 
 111. Id. at 1422. 
 112. Wiltbank, At the Individual Level, supra note 11, at 8 (―Broadly, these results 
resemble the returns of the venture capital projects. . . .‖). 
 113. Id. at 9. 
 114. Wiltbank, Investment Practices, supra note 11, at 19. 
 115. Id. at 18 (citing C.M. Mason & R.T. Harrison, Is It Worth It? The Rates of Return 
from Informal Venture Capital Investments, 17 J. BUS. VENTURING 211 (2002)). 
 116. Goldfarb et al., supra note 11, at 8-9. 
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of continued operation).
117
  This distribution was considered roughly in line 
with general statistics from the VC industry.
118
 
When the authors of the Brobeck study considered the outcomes of 
angel versus VC financings within their sample data, the results were 
mixed.  The study showed that companies receiving VC funding only in 
their initial financings were, on balance, more successful (i.e., experienced 
more mergers and IPOs) than companies receiving angel and VC financing 
or angel financing only.
119
  But the study also showed that companies with 
angel-only financings were significantly less likely to fail than companies 
receiving VC financing.
120
  Within a subset of transactions involving 
smaller dollar amounts, the angel-only financings appeared to outperform 
companies that received VC financing, including a higher rate of successful 
liquidity events.
121
 
The methodological challenges of studying angel investing outcomes 
are admittedly significant.  Moreover, in light of poor VC fund 
performance over some periods of time,
122
 it is not an unqualified ringing 
endorsement of angel investments to say that they perform about the same 
as VC funds.  These studies of angel investing outcomes, however, should 
begin to change our perceptions of angel investors as amateurish and 
lacking bargaining power.  At a minimum, the studies indicate that angel 
investors achieve results that are in the ballpark of those achieved by 
professionally managed VC funds, in which sophisticated institutional 
investors invest. 
D. How Angels Succeed 
How, then, do angels achieve these similar investment results when 
investing at the high point of information and agency costs and without the 
strong control rights that VC funds demand?  As summarized below, a 
growing body of literature indicates that angel investors do not simply 
settle for weaker rights and make do.  Instead, their investment terms and 
strategies are rational responses to the context in which angel investments 
are made. 
 
 117. Id. at 14. 
 118. See id. (noting that the success of the firms examined in the Brobeck study closely 
paralleled the success of the Venture Enterprise firms). 
 119. Id. at 3, 14-15. 
 120. See id. at 14 (cautioning that while statistics show angel-only firms are more likely 
to survive, this outcome may  be explained by a high incidence of ―inactive‖ survival). 
 121. Id. at 15-20. 
 122. See supra note 75. 
CABLEFINALIZED_THREE 1/23/2011  1:47 PM 
130 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:1 
  
1. Early Stage 
The early stage at which angels invest may be an advantage, rather 
than a detriment, to angel investors.  In his survey, Wiltbank observed that 
angel investors are more successful when they focus on early-stage 
companies.
123
 
Investing at earlier stages may provide greater opportunity for angel 
investors to use their practical experience as entrepreneurs to help new 
companies.  Wiltbank states:  ―It appears that for these angel investors, a 
stronger focus on early stage opportunities is not a more dangerous 
proposition, and may in fact leverage the unique talents of angel 
investors.‖
124
  Thus, while angel investors are less likely than VC funds to 
negotiate for formal control rights, they are not necessarily passive 
investors.  Wiltbank observed that angel investors spend significant time 
monitoring financial performance of investments and acting as an informal 
sounding board for managers of the companies in which they invest.
125
  
Wiltbank found that this type of participation is significantly related to a 
reduction in negative exits.
126
 
At least one economist also posits that the smaller investment amounts 
typically sought by companies at the seed stage leave the company founder 
with a larger equity stake and a stronger alignment of interests with 
investors, thereby limiting the need for investors to negotiate for control 
rights.
127
 
Finally, angel investors do not need to deal with an entrepreneur in a 
heavy-handed way when VC funds will do so in subsequent rounds of 
investment.  If an angel investor has picked a successful company, it is 
likely that VC investment will follow, and the angel investor can piggyback 
on the monitoring and control rights of the VC fund.  In fact, it is a widely 
held belief that angel investors risk deterring crucial VC funding if they 
seek strong control rights that must then be unwound by VC investors.
128
  
As Darian Ibrahim stated, ―The first reason that angel contract design is 
financially rational is that angels are the first, but not the last, source of 
outside funding for start-ups.‖
129
 
 
 123. See Wiltbank, At the Individual Level, supra note 11, at 1 (finding that a 
concentration in early stage investments is linked to fewer failures). 
 124. Id. at 9. 
 125. Id. at 6. 
 126. Id. at 10. 
 127. Wong, supra note 47, at 3-4. 
 128. Ibrahim, supra note 10, at 1430 (citing an angel investor who advises other angels 
to keep the terms of their investment simple because venture capitalists find complicated 
and burdensome first round investments unappealing). 
 129. Id. at 1428. 
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2. Personal Relationships 
Angel investors locate investments through a personal ―network of 
trust.‖
130
  Angel investors find investment opportunities through friends, 
angel groups in which they participate, and business associates.
131
 
Locating investments through personal connections has a number of 
implications for angel investments.  First, it may reduce the information 
asymmetry that plagues a startup company investing by providing a third-
party validation of the entrepreneur‘s quality.  Simply stated, it is useful to 
an investor if someone that he or she trusts can vouch for the company 
founders as honest and capable. 
Locating investors within a personal network of trust may also 
strengthen the threat of reputational sanctions and may therefore reduce 
agency costs associated with investing in a startup.
132
  An entrepreneur may 
not want to take advantage of an investor who is a part of the 
entrepreneur‘s personal network. 
3. Selective Investment 
Because angels invest their own funds and are under no pressure to 
deploy capital, they can stick to what they know best.  For example, 
Wiltbank observes that angel investors focus within a single area of 
emphasis, such as computer-related, health-care-related, or non-technology 
investments.
133
 
4. Organization Into Groups 
By organizing into groups, angel investors obtain several benefits.
134
  
Participation in a group is essentially a form of syndication, providing that 
 
 130. Id. at 1432. 
 131. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 895 (explaining that the ―network of trust‖ is typically 
derived from business associates, other angels, entrepreneurs from companies formerly 
financed by the angel, VCs, investment bankers, lawyers and accountants); Wiltbank, At the 
Individual Level, supra note 11, at 5 (finding that 40% of respondents located deals 
primarily through friends and 28% through angel groups). 
 132. See Ibrahim, supra note 10, at 1435-36 (discussing the possibility of a ―reputation 
market‖ that may reduce agency costs, but concluding that whether such a market has 
substantial effects is uncertain). 
 133. Wiltbank, At the Individual Level, supra note 10, at 4. 
 134. See Participating Securities Hearings, supra note 6, at 60 (arguing that angel 
investors are becoming ―professionals‖ at investing through educational programs and angel 
group summits); PRESTON, supra note 55, at 1 (listing as advantages of angel groups ―better 
investment decisions, enhanced deal flow, the ability to combine funds into larger equity 
investments, and group social attributes‖). 
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all-important second set of eyes on an investment opportunity and 
increasing deal flow.  Participation in a group also increases deal flow by 
making angel investors more visible.
135
  An angel group that adopts a fund 
structure may allow participants to make smaller investments in a larger 
number of companies, providing diversification.  Investing through a group 
(particularly an actively managed one) can reduce transaction costs by 
streamlining negotiations, due diligence, and post-investment 
monitoring.
136
  Finally, groups allow individual investors to share 
experience and expertise.
137
 
IV. REGULATION OF ANGEL INVESTING 
A. The Ban on General Solicitation 
 
Under the Securities Act of 1933 (the ―Securities Act‖),
138
 every sale 
of a security, including the preferred stock that startup companies sell to 
angel or VC investors, must be registered or must qualify for an exemption 
from registration.
139
  In the absence of registration or an exemption, a 
startup company and the individuals who control it may be liable to 
investors for the full amount of the investment.
140
  This can be a 
particularly harsh remedy because there is no requirement to prove that the 
purchaser suffered any damage from the failure to register.
141
 
The exemption from registration that most startup companies rely on 
is Rule 506 of Regulation D (―Rule 506‖),
142
 which is a safe harbor based 
on the exemption provided in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act for sales 
not involving a public offering.  Rule 506 is a particularly useful exemption 
because it preempts most state registration requirements.  For a Rule 506 
offering, a state can require only a filing fee and a copy of the same 
―Form D‖ that must be filed with the SEC.
143
 
 
 135. Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 744 (―The high visibility of angel groups reduces search 
costs for entrepreneurs.‖). 
 136. PRESTON, supra note 55, at 8 (―The efficiencies of group due diligence . . . cannot 
be emphasized enough.‖). 
 137. See id. at 4, 11 (indicating that angel groups ―have the combined manpower for 
analysis of multiple or complex . . . opportunities,‖ and that ―[h]aving members with 
different . . . backgrounds can be critical in conducting due diligence‖); Ibrahim, supra 
note 4, at 747 (suggesting that a variety of expertise in angel groups improves investment 
selection and monitoring). 
 138. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77z-3 (2006). 
 139. Id. § 77e. 
 140. Id. § 77o (providing for control-person liability). 
 141. Id. § 77l(a)(1). 
 142. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2009). 
 143. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2006); see also Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 11-12 (describing 
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The requirements of Rule 506 are, with one major exception, flexible 
and compatible with conventional startup company financing.  There is no 
dollar limitation on the offering,
144
 no limitation on the number of sales to 
accredited investors,
145
 and no specified form of disclosure to accredited 
investors.
146
 
One requirement of Rule 506, however, is problematic for startup 
companies:  the ban on general solicitation.  The concept of a general 
solicitation does not expressly appear in the Securities Act.  But Rule 506 
requires that ―neither the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf shall 
offer or sell the securities by any form of general solicitation or general 
advertising.‖
147
  Through no-action letters, the SEC has indicated that the 
best way to avoid making a general solicitation is to ensure that the issuer 
has a ―preexisting, substantive relationship‖ with each potential investor.
148
  
The SEC has described a substantial preexisting relationship as one that is 
formed before the offering begins and that ―would enable the issuer (or a 
person acting on its behalf) to be aware of the financial circumstances or 
sophistication of the persons with whom the relationship exists or that 
otherwise are of some substance and duration.‖
149
 
The SEC‘s ban on general solicitation is more restrictive, or at least 
different in focus, than the U.S. Supreme Court‘s interpretation of 
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act requires.
150
  In SEC v. Ralston Purina 
Co.,
151
 the Court determined that an issuer‘s sale of stock to so-called ―key 
employees‖
152
 did not qualify for exemption under Section 4(2).
153
  In fact, 
the group of employees was large, including personnel that the issuer could 
 
preemption under Rule 506 and the perceived advantage of avoiding sometimes disparate 
state registration requirements). 
 144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2009). 
 145. To qualify as accredited, an investor must satisfy either a net-worth test ($1 million 
for an individual) or an annual-income test ($200,000 individually or $300,000 with a 
spouse).  Id. § 230.501 (2009).  Following enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (the ―Dodd-
Frank Act‖), a natural person must exclude the equity in their primary residence from the 
net worth calculation. 
 146. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2009) (discussing disclosure requirements). 
 147. Id. § 230.502(c). 
 148. Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 13. 
 149. Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55694 
(Dec. 4, 1985). 
 150. Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L.J. 67, 
71–75 (1989) (―The SEC, however, has adopted safe harbor rules that are rather more 
intrusive than the Supreme Court would mandate.‖). 
 151. 346 U.S. 119 (1935). 
 152. Id. at 120. 
 153. Id. at 127. 
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not reasonably presume to be financially sophisticated.
154
  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court rejected the SEC‘s argument that the offering was 
directed at too large a number of offerees, and instead based its decision on 
whether the class of offerees ―need the protection of the Act‖
155
 or instead 
are able to ―fend for themselves.‖
156
  The Court‘s decision, in other words, 
focused on the nature of the potential investors to whom the securities were 
offered, in contrast to the SEC‘s approach in the Regulation D safe harbor 
(which focuses on whether there is a preexisting relationship with each 
offeree).
157
 
Technically, a preexisting relationship is only one way to avoid a 
general solicitation under Rule 506.  For example, the SEC has determined 
that the computer matching services and investment symposiums discussed 
in Part V below do not constitute general solicitations, even though an 
entrepreneur who participates in those investor forums does not have a 
preexisting relationship with each investor.  Further, it is possible that an 
investor will approach an entrepreneur without the entrepreneur ever 
making any solicitation at all, such as when a VC manager learns of an 
investment opportunity and makes the first overture.  Although there is no 
significant discussion of this situation in SEC precedent, it should not 
constitute a general solicitation even without a preexisting relationship.
158
 
Except for those fairly limited situations, however, the preexisting 
relationship requirement is the predominant framework for interpreting the 
ban on general solicitation, and it is especially hard on startup companies 
seeking financing from individual angel investors.  To locate the ten or 
more separate investors necessary for a typical angel round,
159
 a company 
needs to identify a significant number of prospects.  These individual angel 
investors will often be less visible than VC funds.
160
  The startup company 
 
 154. Id. at 121. 
 155. Id. at 125. 
 156. Id. 
 157. To illustrate the distinction, a startup company should, under SEC v. Ralston Purina 
Co., be able to offer its stock to the fifty largest venture capital funds in the United States 
even without any personal connections to those funds.  But, that offering would not comply 
with the substantial preexisting relationship test, and therefore would be suspect under 
Regulation D.  Cf. Daugherty, supra note 150, at 75 (concluding that an offer to ―all red-
headed Price Waterhouse partners residing in Chicago‖ would ―pass muster under Ralston 
Purina‖). 
 158. In fact, many VC funds regularly (and publicly) solicit business plan summaries 
from startups through website features and other means.  This practice implies an exception 
to the preexisting relationship requirement when the investor initiates discussions.  See 
Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 756 (discussing this practice by VC funds). 
 159. See Goldfarb et al., supra note 11, at 10-11 (noting that an average angel-only deal 
includes 12.8 angel investors). 
 160. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 878 (discussing angel investors‘ preference for 
anonymity). 
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itself may have low visibility to potential investors because it lacks 
significant operations or a fully developed product to market.  In this 
environment, it is unlikely that an entrepreneur will have formed personal 
relationships with enough qualified investors before financing is needed. 
By imposing such substantial limitations on issuers‘ ability to sell 
their own securities, the preexisting relationship requirement appears 
designed to channel sales activities through intermediaries.  A number of 
SEC rules and interpretations reinforce this channeling effect.  For 
example, the SEC allows an issuer to rely not only on its own preexisting 
relationships but also on the preexisting relationships of intermediaries, 
such as finders (described below) and registered broker-dealers.
161
  
Moreover, the SEC grants registered broker-dealers substantially more 
leeway than issuers in how they may form relationships with investors.  
The SEC has allowed broker-dealers to maintain or supervise the operation 
of websites that broadly seek out potential investors for the express purpose 
of establishing preexisting relationships for future offerings.
162
  An issuer, 
in contrast, risks engaging in a general solicitation if it affirmatively seeks 
out investors for purposes of forming relationships for future offerings.
163
  
Finally, a startup company‘s own personnel could be required to register as 
broker-dealers if they are involved in sales of the company‘s securities on a 
regular basis, thereby increasing the need to outsource these functions.
164
 
Channeling high-risk investments through expert intermediaries—
particularly those subject to registration requirements and oversight by the 
SEC—does make logical sense from an investor-protection standpoint.  
Registered broker-dealers and investment advisers have duties to clients 
that should, in theory, protect investors.
165
  There is only one problem:  
regulated intermediaries are not actively involved with startup investments.  
Section B below discusses why. 
B. Regulation of Intermediaries 
In addition to the registration requirements of the Securities Act, there 
are also regulations that apply directly to intermediaries.  These regulations 
principally include broker-dealer regulations under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the ―Exchange Act‖)
166
 and investment adviser regulations 
 
 161. Alan J. Berkeley & Alissa A. Parisi, Presentation at ALI-ABA Course of Study on 
Regulation D Offerings and Private Placements, Questions and Answers About an Issuer‘s 
Ability to Obtain Investors in Private Placements, questions 2-10 (2005). 
 162. IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 431821 (July 26, 1996). 
 163. Berkeley & Parisi, supra note 161, question 21. 
 164. See infra text accompanying notes 232–234. 
 165. See infra text accompanying notes 176, 206. 
 166. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006). 
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under the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 (the ―Adviser Act‖).
167
  The 
Exchange Act‘s and the Adviser Act‘s regulation of intermediaries, when 
combined with the ban on general solicitation, can place startups in a no-
win situation. 
1. Broker-Dealer Regulation 
The paradigmatic broker-dealer is the stockbroker who assists clients 
in purchasing or selling publicly traded securities for a commission 
equaling a percentage of the purchase or sale price.  The typical 
stockbroker does not play a significant role in startup company finance 
because the securities issued by startup companies are highly illiquid and 
do not trade between investors with any frequency.  A small subset of 
broker-dealers, often referred to as placement agents, specialize in helping 
startup companies locate investors or assist VC funds in locating 
investments.
168
  However, placement agents who have incurred the expense 
to register as broker-dealers are not typically involved in the early stages of 
startup company finance because the transactions are not large enough to 
generate sufficient commissions.
169
 
That is not to say that broker-dealer regulations are irrelevant to 
startup companies.  The statutory definition of a broker-dealer
170
 is 
sufficiently broad to potentially include a wide variety of other 
intermediaries who could play a role in helping raise capital.  Third-party 
finders and computer matching services, for example, have been frequent 
subjects of SEC no-action letters discussed in detail below. 
Outside of these specific contexts, it is difficult to derive from no-
action letters and judicial opinions a single, comprehensible framework for 
evaluating broker-dealer status, and this can become a source of frustration 
when trying to analyze the regulatory status of new developments like 
angel groups.  Nonetheless, this section reviews the SEC‘s general 
approach to examining broker-dealer status as background for analyzing 
the regulatory status of angel groups. 
 
 167. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006). 
 168. See generally JOSEPH BARTLETT ET AL., ADVANCED PRIVATE EQUITY TERM SHEETS 
AND SERIES A DOCUMENTS 5-44 to -55 (2003) (providing an example of a placement agent 
agreement). 
 169. See American Bar Association, Report and Recommendations of The Task Force on 
Private Placement Broker-Dealers, 60 BUS. LAW. 959, 960 (2005) [hereinafter Task Force 
Report] (indicating that an issuer raising less than $5 million ―will seldom if ever be able to 
attract attention from fully licensed members of the [National Association of Securities 
Dealers]‖); BARTLETT, supra note 168, at 5–55. 
 170. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
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a. General Framework 
Under the Exchange Act, a person or entity ―engaged in the business 
of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others‖ is a 
broker
171
 and a person or entity ―engaged in the business of buying and 
selling securities for such person‘s own account‖ is a dealer.
172
  
Comparable definitions under state law are similar to the federal statute.
173
  
Brokers and dealers are referred to collectively using the combined term 
―broker-dealers.‖ 
Broker-dealers must register with the SEC and be licensed by the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (―FINRA‖), typically by one or 
more states.
174
  Status as a registered broker-dealer subjects the 
intermediary to a wide range of legal requirements such as competency 
standards (including exam requirements), recordkeeping requirements, 
minimum net capital amounts,
175
 and obligations to make determinations 
about the suitability of investments for customers.
176
 
Under the language of the Exchange Act, two basic questions must be 
answered in the affirmative to determine that a person or business is a 
broker-dealer.  First, the person or business must be ―effecting transactions 
in securities.‖
177
  Second, the person or business must be ―engaged in the 
business‖ of doing so.
178
 
Courts and the SEC may consider a dizzying number of factors in 
answering these two questions.  For example, one commentator has 
identified the following activities as potentially indicating that a person or 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A). 
 173. For example, the Uniform Securities Act defines a broker-dealer as ―a person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for 
the person‘s own account.‖  UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(4)(2002). 
 174. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 901-02. 
 175. Id. at 901. 
 176. See Charles R. Mills et al., Customer Transactions:  Suitability, Unauthorized 
Trading, and Churning, in BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 6-1, -3 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 
2009) (―[A] broker-dealer . . . must have reasonable grounds for believing that the 
transaction is suitable for the customer‘s financial and investment circumstances, needs, and 
objectives based on the facts, if any, disclosed by the customer.‖).  Section 913 of the Dodd-
Frank Act requires the SEC to conduct studies regarding whether broker-dealers should be 
subject to the more stringent fiduciary duty imposed on investment advisers.  See Cutting 
Through the Confusion, supra note 28, at 3-4 (describing heightened legal obligations of 
investment advisers). 
 177. Laura S. Pruit & Wendy B. Hart, Brokers, Dealers and “Finders”, in BROKER-
DEALER REGULATION, supra note 176, at 30-8 to -15; DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER 
REGULATION §§ 1-38 to -51 (2008). 
 178. Pruit & Hart, supra note 177, at 30-16 to -19; LIPTON, supra note 177, §§ 1-32 to -
38. 
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business is effecting transactions in securities:  structuring securities 
transactions, helping identify potential purchasers, screening 
creditworthiness of securities purchasers, facilitating negotiations of 
transactions, soliciting securities transactions, facilitating the execution of a 
transaction or participating in order-taking and order-routing, handling 
customer funds and securities, and preparing and sending confirmations of 
securities transactions.
179
  The SEC cites the following factors as relevant to 
whether a potential broker-dealer is engaged in the business:  ―receiving 
transaction-related compensation; holding one‘s self out as a broker, as 
executing trades, or as assisting others in settling securities transactions; 
and participating in the securities business with some degree of 
regularity.‖
180
  The ―regularity of participation‖ factor has been the basis 
for determining that an isolated instance of broker-like activity does not 
satisfy the engaged-in-the-business requirement.
181
 
b. Compensation 
One particularly prominent factor in the SEC's analysis of broker-
dealer status is whether the intermediary receives transaction-based 
compensation, such as a commission based on the size or success of 
securities transactions.  Because this factor is so important, it is worth 
considering what constitutes transaction-based compensation and why the 
SEC cares. 
According to the SEC, transaction-based compensation is relevant to 
broker-dealer status for two separate reasons: 
[T]he receipt of transaction-based compensation often indicates 
that such a person is engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities.  Compensation based on transactions in 
securities can induce high pressure sales tactics and other 
problems of investor protection often associated with unregulated 
and unsupervised brokerage activities.
182
 
 
 179. Pruit & Hart, supra note 177, at 30-8 to -15. 
 180. MuniAuction, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 291007 (March 13, 2000). 
 181. LIPTON, supra note 177, §§ 1-32 to 1-33 (―Critical to the concept of being engaged 
in the business of securities transactions is ‗regularity of participation.‘‖).  For example, the 
SEC has determined that personnel of a corporate general partner would not be a broker-
dealer when selling units in the limited partnership on an isolated basis.  Id. § 1-34 (citing 
Robinson Res., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 6966, at *2 (July 19, 1973)).  A small 
number of transactions, however, may satisfy the regularity-of-participation requirement.  
See id. § 1-35 (citing IDK Ventures, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 287029, at *3 
(Oct. 18, 1990), in which two sales with the possibility of future transactions constituted 
regular participation). 
 182. Persons Deemed Not to be Brokers, Exchange Act Release No. 20943, 30 SEC 
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The first sentence suggests that transaction-based compensation is 
relevant as an indication of the true nature of the services being performed.  
For example, if the metric for determining the amount of compensation is 
the occurrence of securities transactions, this suggests that the primary 
purpose of the services is effecting those transactions.  The second sentence 
suggests that transaction-based compensation creates risks to investors that 
warrant regulatory oversight.
183
 
Clearly, receipt of a traditional commission is transaction-based.  
Receipt of a commission has been described as a ―hallmark of a broker-
customer relationship.‖
184
  But any form of compensation that is based on 
the ―number, size or outcome of securities transactions‖ may be considered 
transaction-based.
185
  For example, the SEC considers a ―flat fee‖ that is 
subsequently adjusted based on the success of the offering under a ―look-
back escalator‖ to be transaction-based.
186
 
There are forms of compensation that may bear some resemblance to 
commissions but that have not been fatal to no-action requests.  For 
example, the SEC has granted no-action relief when a third-party assisting 
an issuer in locating investors received a fee for each questionnaire 
completed by a potential investor and an additional fee for each investor 
meeting with the issuer.  The fee, however, was not contingent on whether 
any securities purchases were actually made.
187
 
In addition, the SEC has granted no-action relief as to broker-dealer 
status when a person or business receives a management fee based on a 
percentage of assets under management, similar to the fee received by a 
VC manager.
188
  This conclusion is consistent with the general framework 
 
Docket 618, 622 (May 9, 1984). 
 183. Orcutt, supra note 2, at 908 (―The concept is that transaction-based compensation 
could induce the finder to engage in abusive or sharp selling practices based on her stake in 
the outcome of the transaction, which favors the greater regulatory oversight imposed on 
registered broker-dealers.‖). 
 184. LIPTON, supra note 177, § 1-41.13. 
 185. Pruit & Hart, supra note 177, at 30-17. 
 186. Id. at 30-18 (citing Welton Street Investments, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 
WL 1896896 (June 27, 2006)). 
 187. Orcutt, supra note 2, 861, 913-15 (discussing Colonial Equities Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1988 WL 234557 (June 28, 1988)). 
 188. McGovern Advisory Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45930, at *2 
(Sept. 8, 1984) (responding to request of a financial planner).  A registered investment 
adviser managed assets of individuals and employee benefit plans, including making 
investments on the clients‘ behalf in money market accounts and mutual funds.  In granting 
no-action relief as to broker-dealer status, the SEC noted that ―compensation to the 
Company will be based solely upon the value of the assets under management, and will not 
be determined, directly or indirectly, on a transactional basis or otherwise based on the 
volume of transactions in securities.‖  Id.  See also Dana Investment Advisers, Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 718968, at *16 (Oct. 12, 1994) (granting no-action relief to 
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for evaluating compensation described above.  At first blush, the 
management fee might raise the same concerns regarding hard selling 
practices as a commission.  By tying the amount of fees to the amount of 
assets under management, the fee structure gives the recipient a salesman‘s 
stake in increasing the amount of funds placed under management.  But, a 
fee based on the value of assets under management also gives the 
intermediary an ongoing stake in the long-term performance of the assets 
because the fee will decrease or increase over time based on long-term 
performance of the account.  By aligning the long-term interests of the 
intermediary and the client, this type of management fee should pose less 
risk to an investor than a commission based on price at the time of initial 
investment.  Moreover, a fee based on assets under management does not 
strongly indicate that the true nature of the services is the sales function of 
a traditional broker-dealer.  For example, the recipient of the fee does not 
earn more by engaging in a high volume of transactions with the client‘s 
funds. 
c. Finders 
With angel investment amounts typically being too small to attract the 
attention of registered broker-dealers, startup companies seeking angel 
financing may turn to unregistered ―finders‖ who locate investors for a fee 
while trying to limit their activities in accordance with SEC no-action 
letters to avoid broker-dealer status.  There are several thoughtful analyses 
of the so-called finder exemption, including law review articles,
189
 reports 
of an American Bar Association Task Force,
190
 and reports of forums 
organized by the SEC.
191
  The current market for finders demonstrates the 
consequences of restrictive intermediary regulations in the context of 
startup company finance:  low-quality intermediaries operating in an 
environment of regulatory uncertainty. 
No-action letters defining the scope of the finder exemption reflect the 
following principles: 
Receipt of transaction-based compensation is a strong indicator 
of broker-dealer status.
192
  The SEC has allowed a finder to 
 
hospital association that introduced its members to an investment fund and received a fee 
based on a percentage of assets under management by the fund). 
 189. E.g., Orcutt, supra note 2 (discussing the role of finders in private capital markets 
and proposing a new class of registered finders exempt from broker-dealer regulations). 
 190. E.g., Task Force Report, supra note 169 (discussing the regulatory status of 
finders). 
 191. E.g., Orcutt, supra note 2, at 866-67 (discussing SEC‘s Annual Government-
Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation). 
 192. HUGH H. MAKENS, GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL 
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receive a commission only when the additional restrictions 
described below are strictly met and the finder activity is an 
isolated occurrence.
193
 
 
A finder should not be involved in securities transactions 
frequently.  The SEC is hesitant to provide no-action relief to an 
intermediary with a history of activity as a broker-dealer or that 
holds itself out as being a securities professional.
194
 
 
Finders must play a limited role in transactions.  A finder should 
limit its activities to referring names of investors to the issuer, 
without becoming involved in structuring terms of the financing, 
negotiating with purchasers, or making recommendations to 
investors.
195
 
Finders who violate these principles could face significant 
consequences.  The commission agreement between the company and the 
intermediary is likely voidable, and the intermediary risks enforcement 
actions and civil penalties from state and federal regulators.
196
 
The consequences to an issuer of using an unregistered broker-dealer 
are less clear.  Commentators have identified theories under which an 
issuer could face SEC enforcement actions
197
 or be liable to investors
198
 due 
 
FORMATION, CAPITAL FORMATION:  MAKING FINDERS VIABLE 23-25 (2004); Alan J. Berkley 
& Alissa J. Altongy, Use and Compensation of “Finders” to Locate Purchasers in Private 
Placements, in REGULATION D OFFERINGS AND PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 51, 56 (2000); 
Virginia K. Kapner, When Finders Bring Trouble:  Avoiding Pitfalls of Working With 
Unlicensed Broker-Dealers, 47 BOSTON BAR J. 14, 15 (2003). 
 193. E.g., Paul Anka, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176891 (May 17, 1991) 
(allowing a famous entertainer to introduce investors to a professional hockey team on the 
condition that his activities be limited).  The SEC has withdrawn, without any helpful 
explanation, at least one additional no-action letter permitting transaction-based 
compensation to a finder.  Orcutt, supra note 2, at 861, 906 (discussing Dominion 
Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 669838 (Mar. 7, 2000)). 
 194. MAKENS, supra note 192, at 27; Berkley & Altongy, supra note 192, at 51, 56; 
Orcutt, supra note 2, at 915-16. 
 195. MAKENS, supra note 192, at 25; Berkley & Altongy, supra note 192, at 51, 54; 
Kapner, supra note 192, at 14; Orcutt, supra note 2, at 906. 
 196. See Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 997-99 (discussing SEC enforcement 
actions against unregistered broker-dealers and civil remedies under Section 29(b) of the 
Exchange Act). 
 197. See Orcutt, supra note 2, at 925 (discussing the possibility of enforcement actions 
against issuers for aiding and abetting a violation of Section 15 of the Exchange Act). 
 198. See Task Force Report, supra note 169, at 999 (discussing the possibility that an 
issuer would be required to repay commissions to investors because the unregistered broker-
dealer is an agent of the issuer, and could even be required to refund the entire investment 
amount because the entire purchase agreement is ―part of an illegal arrangement with the 
unregistered financial intermediary‖ that is voidable under Section 29(b) of the Exchange 
Act). 
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to use of an unregistered broker-dealer.  But the SEC has not made a 
practice of pursuing enforcement actions against issuers simply for use of 
an unregistered broker-dealer,
199
 and case law granting a right of rescission 
against an issuer for using an unregistered broker-dealer typically involves 
fraudulent activity or other special circumstances.
200
  The civil remedies 
provisions in many state statutes appear broad enough to encompass this 
type of claim by an investor against an issuer, but reported decisions are 
not easily found.
201
 
This regulatory uncertainty likely affects the quality of finders 
available to startup companies, at least at the margins.
202
  A startup 
company has limited resources to pay a substantial fee that is not tied to 
successfully raising capital.  A startup might be willing to pay a 
commission because the primary regulatory risk is borne by the finder, but 
one would expect the most qualified potential finders to apply their talents 
elsewhere in light of the regulatory risk. 
2. Investment Adviser Regulation 
The paradigmatic investment adviser provides a client with advice to 
buy or sell securities or has management discretion over a client‘s 
securities account.  Investment advisers go by a number of names, such as 
―money manager,‖ ―wealth manager,‖ and ―financial planner.‖
203
  These 
common types of investment advisers do not play a significant role in 
financing startup companies, perhaps because the cost of locating, 
investigating, and monitoring investments in startup companies is too high 
in light of the small investment sizes and the lack of publicly available 
information about the companies. 
But investment adviser regulation is relevant to the financing of 
startup companies because it potentially applies to managers of investment 
funds, including VC funds.  A fund manager may be viewed as providing 
investment advice to a fund entity or to individual investors in a fund, 
although many VC funds escape investment adviser regulation for reasons 
 
 199. Id. at 998 (―We found no cases where a finder crossed the line into broker-dealer 
activity for which the issuer was then punished in the absence of such fraud.‖). 
 200. Id. at 999 (finding ―little guidance‖ on rescission claims against an issuer simply for 
use of an unregistered broker-dealer). 
 201. See id. at 1003-07 (reviewing uniform acts, treatises, and state case law). 
 202. See id. at 973 (―A concern expressed to the Task Force is that the unregistered 
financial intermediary makes it very difficult for smaller registered, reputable broker-dealers 
to become involved in raising funds.‖); Orcutt, supra note 2, at 926 (―[S]ome industry 
commentators have stated that many of the current breed of Private Placement Finders are of 
dubious reputation.‖). 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
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described below.  As background for analyzing the regulatory status of 
VC managers and then angel group managers, this Section summarizes the 
SEC‘s general approach to determining investment adviser status. 
a. General Framework 
Under the Adviser Act, an investment adviser must register with the 
SEC or one or more states.
204
  Registration as an investment adviser 
involves substantial disclosure requirements, recordkeeping requirements, 
the possibility of periodic inspection by the SEC, and limitations on 
permitted forms of compensation.
205
  Registered investment advisers also 
have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of a client.
206
  The regulation 
of investment advisers is bifurcated between state and federal regulators, 
with larger investment advisers registering at the federal level and smaller 
investment advisers registering at the state level.
207
 
The term ―investment adviser‖ is defined in Section 202(a) of the 
Adviser Act and has been interpreted by the SEC to include a person who 
―(a) provides advice, or issues reports or analyses, regarding securities or as 
to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities 
(‗investment advice‘); (b) provides such services for compensation; and 
(c) is in the business of providing such services.‖
208
  States typically define 
the term ―investment adviser‖ in a similar manner.
209
 
b. Advice Regarding Securities 
―Advice,‖ for purposes of investment adviser status, is construed 
broadly.  The SEC has explained:  ―A person who makes recommendations 
about specific securities or who simply provides advice concerning the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of investing in securities in general 
 
 204. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006). 
 205. Id. §§ 80b-4 to 80b-5. 
 206. THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS 169-
70 (2009) (describing obligation to determine that investments are suitable to client‘s 
objectives, needs, and circumstances). 
 207. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (2006) (discussing registration requirement). 
 208. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 11 (2000), at  n.7 [hereinafter SLB No. 11]. 
 209. For example, the Uniform Securities Act defines an investment adviser as: 
[A] person that, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, 
either directly or indirectly or through publications or writings, as to the value 
of securities or the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities 
or that, for compensation and as a part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities. 
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(15) (2002). 
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is providing investment advice and satisfies the first element.‖
210
  For 
example, the SEC has taken the position that a financial planner who 
advises individuals or families about allocating assets among certain types 
of securities and non-security products will likely be deemed an investment 
adviser, even if he or she does not recommend any particular security.
211
 
Yet there are a number of securities-related activities that the SEC 
believes fall outside of even this broad notion of securities advice.  For 
example, the SEC has determined that providing information or data related 
to securities is not securities advice when:  ―(1) the information is readily 
available to the public in its raw state, (2) the categories of information 
presented are not highly selective, and (3) the information is not organized 
or presented in a manner which suggests the purchase, holding, or sale of 
any security or securities.‖
212
  Based on this three-prong test, the SEC has 
determined that operators of financial data services are not investment 
advisers even when the data is accompanied by software tools that assist 
professional investors in modeling and analyzing future performance of 
securities.
213
 
It may also be possible to classify information regarding investments 
as ―educational‖ and therefore beyond the scope of the Adviser Act.  For 
example, the SEC granted no-action relief to a nonprofit organization, the 
Missouri Innovation Center, that published a newsletter with a ―general 
education‖ section including guidance on ―how to approach and analyze 
such investments‖ and ―analyzing financial statements or business 
plans.‖
214
 
 
 210. SLB No. 11, supra note 208, at n.9. 
 211. Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension 
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component 
of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act, Release No. IA-1092, 1987 WL 
154624, at *38402 n.4 (Oct. 16, 1987). 
 212. EJV Partners, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 372147 (Dec. 7, 1992). 
 213. Id.; see also Wilson Associates, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234362 (Apr. 25, 
1988) (demonstrating that the SEC emphasizes sophistication of the potential customers, the 
role of users in selecting which securities to analyze and calculations to perform, the general 
availability of the formulas, and payment by flat fees not based on the value of an 
investment portfolio); LEMKE & LINS, supra note 206, at 7 (discussing EJV Partners, SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 372147 (Dec. 7, 1992), and Executive Asset Management, Inc., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 235366 (Dec. 15, 1988)). 
 214. Missouri Innovation Center, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 643949 (Oct. 
17, 1995).  The Missouri Innovation Center argued that this portion of the newsletter did not 
constitute securities advice because of its educational nature and because small business 
capital investments are not a specific type or category of securities.  The SEC did not 
significantly discuss why it granted no-action relief, other than to recite the three-prong test 
discussed above and to require ―strict adherence‖ to the facts in the letter.  Id. 
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c. For Compensation 
The SEC construes the for compensation component of the investment 
adviser definition so broadly that it is ordinarily not at issue.  The 
compensation does not need to be in any particular form or even explicitly 
tied to investment advice.
215
 
d. In The Business 
The final requirement of the definition—that the adviser be engaged in 
the business of providing advice—has also been construed broadly but has 
provided some basis for arguing that occasional or incidental investment 
advice does not require registration.  The SEC states that a person is 
engaged in the business of providing investment advice if it: 
(a) holds itself out as an investment adviser or as one who 
provides investment advice; 
(b) receives any separate or additional compensation that 
represents a clearly definable charge for providing advice about 
securities, regardless of whether the compensation is separate 
from or included within any overall compensation, or receives 
transaction-based compensation if the client implements the 
advice; or 
(c) on anything other than rare, isolated and non-periodic 
instances, provides specific investment advice, including a 
recommendation or analysis about specific securities or specific 
categories of securities.
216
 
The SEC has used this test, for example, in considering whether 
financial advisers to issuers of municipal bonds may occasionally provide 
advice regarding where to invest proceeds from the bond offering on a 
short-term basis.
217
  Although the financial adviser might recommend 
investment in financial products that are securities, these services may not 
trigger investment adviser registration if the adviser does not advertise 
these ancillary services and they are provided infrequently and without 
additional compensation.
218
 
 
 215. See SLB No. 11, supra note 208, at n.9 (outlining the SEC‘s interpretation of the 
three prong test for investment adviser status). 
 216. Id. at n.11. 
 217. Id.  The core service of these advisers is recommending how and when 
municipalities should issue bonds.  The SEC believes that these core services do not require 
registration because Congress did not intend the Adviser Act to apply to ―any person who 
merely advises issuers concerning the structuring of their financings.‖  Id. at n.12. 
 218. Id. at n.16. 
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e. Form of Compensation 
Form of compensation is an important factor for determining whether 
a service provider is engaged in the business of providing investment 
advice.  Just as a commission may reveal that a potential broker-dealer is in 
fact effecting transactions in securities, transaction-based compensation for 
following investment advice or other forms of compensation that 
―represents a clearly definable charge‖ for advice about securities may 
reveal that the true nature of services is investment advice.
219
 
Unlike the broker-dealer context, the SEC does not, in its analysis of 
investment adviser status, explicitly focus on the potential risks to investors 
from a particular form of compensation.  The Adviser Act and the SEC, 
however, are not altogether silent on the incentives created by different 
forms of investment adviser compensation.  Section 205(a) of the Adviser 
Act generally prohibits registered investment advisers from receiving a 
performance fee based on ―a share of capital gains‖ or ―capital appreciation 
of the funds‖ in the client‘s account.
220
  As described below, the prohibition 
on performance fees is based on a perception that they potentially harm 
investors. 
Performance fees are described as creating a situation in which it is 
―heads I win, tails you lose‖ for the adviser.
221
  This is because an adviser 
receiving a performance fee does not fully internalize the cost of large 
negative returns and therefore may have an incentive to engage in riskier 
investments.
222
  When receiving a performance fee, for example, a total loss 
on an investment will not have a direct negative consequence to the 
adviser, at least not one that is worse than a break-even investment.  In 
contrast, a total loss on an investment directly reduces a fee based on the 
total value of assets under management. 
A related concern about performance fees is that they may cause an 
adviser to time transactions in self-serving ways.
223
  For example, an 
adviser may want to lock in gains at a particular time to secure his or her 
fees based on personal needs, even when holding the investment would be 
more advantageous to the client‘s long-term goals. 
Despite these potential risks, the prohibition is not absolute.  For 
example, Section 205(b)(3) of the Adviser Act provides that the manager of 
 
 219. Id. at n.17. 
 220. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2006). 
 221. LEMKE & LINS, supra note 206, at 152. 
 222. See id. (explaining the concern that advisers could speculate with client assets to 
earn advisory fees). 
 223. See id. at 152-53 (describing the possibility of advisers timing transactions when 
compensation is based on capital gains or appreciation). 
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a ―business development company‖ may receive a performance fee.
224
  The 
definition of a business development company is intended to cover the 
typical VC fund.  To qualify, a fund must be engaged in the business of 
investing in and providing ―managerial assistance‖ to privately held 
companies or other issuers for which traditional equity financing is difficult 
to obtain.
225
  A performance fee under Section 205(b)(3) must not exceed 
20% and must be net of realized losses in the fund‘s portfolio.
226
 
The requirements of Section 205(b) are responsive to the concerns that 
normally accompany performance fees.  First, the requirement that gains be 
calculated net of losses helps alleviate the ―heads I win, tails you lose‖ 
incentives that might otherwise be created by a performance fee; any losses 
from bad investments are set off against the gains from good investments 
so that the fund manager is internalizing the downside of risky investments.  
The risk of manipulative timing is also reduced in the context of a business 
development company because investments by VC funds are highly 
illiquid, so the fund manager has little control over the timing of exiting an 
investment.  Finally, the fact that business development companies must 
provide substantial managerial assistance to the companies in which they 
invest also ensures that a fund manager will internalize the risk of each 
investment.  A fund manager who spends substantial time screening, 
monitoring, and managing an investment will have wasted valuable time if 
that investment fails to generate any gains.  The same magnitude of 
opportunity cost may not be incurred by the manager of a portfolio of 
publicly traded stocks that are relatively easy to buy, sell, and research 
from publicly available sources. 
Another exception to the prohibition on performance fees is based on 
the sophistication of the individual clients.  Rule 205-3 under the Adviser 
Act allows an investment adviser to charge a performance fee to ―qualified 
clients‖
227
 who meet wealth standards and are presumed to be sophisticated. 
Although the law of performance fees is not, according to a strict 
reading of the SEC‘s guidance, an explicit component of evaluating 
investment adviser status, one can reasonably expect that the SEC will 
interject concerns about risks to investors in its analysis of investment 
adviser status, as it has in evaluating broker-dealer status.  Accordingly, 
when this article evaluates the investor adviser status of angel group 
managers in Part V below, it considers both what the form of their 
compensation indicates about the true nature of their services and whether 
the compensation poses any special risk to investors. 
 
 224. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006). 
 225. Id. § 80a-2(a)(48). 
 226. Id. § 80b-3. 
 227. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2009). 
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3. VC Fund Regulation 
Like conventional broker-dealers and investment advisers, VC funds 
act as financial intermediaries.
228
  A number of regulatory schemes are 
potentially applicable to those activities, including the investment adviser 
and broker-dealer regulations described above and the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (the ―Investment Company Act‖).
229
  VC funds, 
however, often escape substantial regulation as intermediaries through a 
combination of statutory exemptions secured by the VC industry through 
lobbying efforts, regulatory exemptions based on the SEC‘s deference to 
VC activities, and belief by some VC managers that their activities are 
sufficiently different from conventional intermediaries that they are outside 
of the scope of the regulatory schemes. 
a. Investment Company Act 
Traditional mutual funds through which most Americans invest in the 
public equities markets are registered as ―investment companies‖ with the 
SEC and are subject to substantial regulation under the Investment 
Company Act.  The Investment Company Act might seem like a natural 
framework for regulating VC funds, which also pool capital of individual 
investors for professional management.  The disclosure and other 
requirements of the Investment Company Act are viewed as incompatible 
with the operations of a typical VC fund, however, and VC funds have an 
easy time avoiding regulation under the Investment Company Act.  A fund 
is not required to register under the Investment Company Act if it has fewer 
than 100 investors or if all investors are ―qualified purchasers‖ owning at 
least $5 million in investments.
230
  Typically, a VC fund can and does work 
within these limitations and avoids regulation under the Investment 
Company Act.
231
 
b. Broker-Dealer Status 
Although VC managers facilitate securities transactions by bringing 
together startup companies and institutional capital, they are generally not 
subject to broker-dealer regulation probably because of the ―issuer 
exemption‖ from the definition of a broker-dealer.  An issuer selling its 
own securities is not a dealer because it does not typically both sell and buy 
 
 228. Triantis, supra note 26, at 307-19. 
 229. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2009). 
 230. Id. at §§ 80a-3(c)(1), 80a-3(c)(7). 
 231. HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 5-3 to -4. 
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securities (it only sells securities) and is not a broker because it does not 
sell securities for the account of others.
232
  The issuer exemption is defined 
through no-action letters
233
 and a safe-harbor rule
234
 that describe the extent 
to which personnel of an issuer can be involved in securities transactions 
without becoming broker-dealers. 
The issuer exemption most clearly applies when a VC manager is 
involved in ―downstream‖ sales of fund interests to VC investors.
235
  The 
sale of fund interests is viewed as a sale by the fund, not by the manager 
acting ―for the account of others.‖
236
  The ongoing management 
responsibilities of the fund manager support this interpretation.  The SEC 
has recognized that a bona fide general partner of a limited partnership with 
ongoing management responsibilities may take advantage of the issuer 
exemption when selling interests in the limited partnership.
237
  VC funds 
easily fit within this framework because they are typically structured as 
limited partnerships with the VC fund manager serving as the general 
partner and the VC investors as limited partners.
238
 
There is also a theoretical issue about whether a VC manager is a 
broker by virtue of ―upstream‖ purchases of securities of portfolio 
company stock on behalf of the VC fund.  Conceptually, the purchase of 
portfolio company securities is the mirror image of the downstream sale of 
fund interests to investors and should therefore also fall outside the 
statutory broker-dealer definition under what could be called the ―purchaser 
exemption.‖
239
 
c. Investment Adviser Status 
The more difficult question for VC fund managers has been whether 
they must register under the Adviser Act as advisers to either the fund 
 
 232. LIPTON, supra note 177, § 1-38 (quoting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2006)). 
 233. Id. §§ 1-42.2 to 1-42.3. 
 234. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a4-1 (2009). 
 235. Cf. SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, supra note 30, at 241-45 (identifying Rule 3a4-1 and no-
action letters as a basis for claiming that hedge fund advisers and their personnel are not 
broker-dealers). 
 236. LIPTON, supra note 177, §§ 1-38 (quoting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2006)). 
 237. Partners in Housing, SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 7622 (Dec. 29, 1972); 
DeMatteis Development Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 WL 6492 (Sept. 2, 1971). 
 238. HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 5-8 to -10.1. 
 239. Even more theoretical is the possibility that the fund is a ―dealer‖ of securities.  
Even in the context of hedge funds, which buy and sell a large volume of securities and 
therefore could more likely be viewed as dealers, dealer status is not a major concern.  
SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, supra note 30, at 246-47. 
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entity or the individual investors in a fund.  VC fund managers typically do 
not register under the Adviser Act, either because they take the ―non-
adviser‖ approach of arguing that they do not come within the definition of 
an investment adviser or because they rely on the ―private adviser 
exemption‖ for advisers to fewer than 15 clients. 
Under the non-adviser approach, VC fund managers argue that there is 
no traditional client-adviser relationship between the VC fund manager and 
either the VC investors or the fund entity.  They point out that the 
VC manager has complete control of the VC fund and a VC investor has no 
right to make investment decisions regarding the portfolio companies or to 
even withdraw from the fund at regular intervals.  In other words, once 
formed, the fund is an internally managed entity with the fund manager 
directing its activities in its role as general partner, rather than a client 
relying on the advice of a third-party adviser.
240
  The non-adviser approach 
has support in case law holding that the trustee of an investment trust does 
not come within the definition of an investment adviser because a trustee 
―acts himself as principal‖ on behalf of the trust rather than ―advis[ing] the 
trust corpus.‖
241
 
In the case of Abrahamson v. Fleischner,
242
 the Second Circuit 
arguably called into question the non-adviser approach by holding that the 
general partner of an investment partnership was an investment adviser to 
the partnership entity and potentially to the individual limited partners who 
invested in the fund.  Despite the Abrahamson case, VC managers may 
continue to take the non-adviser approach by distinguishing the operation 
of a VC fund from the investment partnership at issue in Abrahamson.  
VC managers have emphasized that the Abrahamson partnership provided 
an annual withdrawal right so that investors had some ability to ―reject‖ the 
advice of the general partner based on periodic performance reports.  
VC fund managers have also tried to distinguish their activities from the 
facts of the Abrahamson case by emphasizing a VC manager‘s ongoing 
role in providing managerial assistance to portfolio companies, as opposed 
to the partnership in Abrahamson, which made more passive investments 
often in publicly traded securities.
243
  Since the Abrahamson case, SEC 
staff has questioned in at least one no-action letter the case law regarding 
investment trusts that was previously thought to support the non-adviser 
approach, but the SEC (the agency itself, rather than the staff acting 
through no-action letters) has not taken a formal position on the continuing 
 
 240. HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 5-72 to -74. 
 241. Id. § 5-74 (quoting Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415, 420 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974)). 
 242. 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 243. HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 5-73 to -74. 
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validity of the non-adviser approach.
244
 
A VC manager that is unwilling to accept the uncertainties of the non-
adviser approach can currently rely instead on the ―private adviser 
exemption‖ from Adviser Act registration requirements.  Under the private 
adviser exemption, an adviser to fewer than 15 ―clients‖ is not required to 
register under the Adviser Act.
245
  VC fund managers can rely on this 
exemption because Rule 203(b)(3)-1 under the Adviser Act
246
 designates 
the fund entity itself, and not each VC investor, as the client.  Therefore, a 
VC manager can manage up to 15 separate funds under the private adviser 
exemption.
247
 
Similarly, Congress enacted a statutory provision in 1980, shortly after 
the Abrahamson case, providing that a business development company (a 
definition that would encompass most conventional VC funds)
248
 counts as 
only a single client for purposes of the private adviser exemption.
249
  The 
special treatment of business development companies was a result of 
lobbying efforts by the VC fund industry in reaction to the Abrahamson 
case.
250
 
The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act
251
 eliminates the private adviser 
exemption effective July 21, 2011.
252
  The new law, however, specifically 
exempts VC managers from registration under the Adviser Act.  Other 
recent SEC rules aimed at hedge funds
253
 also contain exemptions intended 
to benefit VC funds.
254
  These exemptions appear to recognize the 
 
 244. Id. § 5-74 (citing SS Programs Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 10963 (Oct. 
17, 1974)). 
 245. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006). 
 246. 15 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2009). 
 247. The rule is conditioned on two requirements:  (a) that the manager does not tailor 
investment advice to the objectives of individual VC investors and (b) that VC investors are 
not otherwise investment adviser clients of the VC manager.  Id. 
 248. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(48) (2006) (defining 
―business development company‖); HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 5-30 to -32 (describing the 
managerial assistance requirement associated with business development companies). 
 249. HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 5-75 to -76. 
 250. Id. § 5-75 (―To resolve the uncertainty, the venture capital industry was able to 
persuade Congress to add in the 1980 Amendments to the 1940 Act a definition of ‗business 
development company‘ (‗BDC‘) to the Advisers Act . . . together with an amendment to the 
Act‘s private adviser exemption.‖). 
 251. See supra note 145. 
 252. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 253. See, e.g., Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 
Investment Advisers Act, Release No. IA-2333, 2004 WL 2785492 (Dec. 2, 2004) 
(including rules requiring hedge fund managers to register that were overturned by 
Goldstein v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 254. HALLORAN, supra note 25, at 5-81 (discussing proposed Rules 216 and 509 under 
the Adviser Act, and the SEC‘s statements in the adopting release that business development 
companies are exempted due to their important role in financing small businesses). 
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importance of VC funds to small capital formation
255
 and reflect a 
perception that VC funds present less risk to investors than do hedge 
funds.
256
 
On the whole, then, the SEC‘s approach to regulating VC funds is 
cautiously deferential.  While SEC staff has resisted the non-adviser 
approach, special exemptions from registration requirements do accord 
favorable status to VC funds. 
V. REGULATION OF INVESTOR FORUMS 
The organization of angel investors into groups potentially raises new 
issues under securities regulations described above.
257
  For example, a 
startup company that presents to an angel group does not likely have a 
substantial preexisting relationship with each member of the group.  Does 
this mean that presenting to an angel group is a ―general solicitation‖ that 
disqualifies the company from relying on Rule 506?  And if angel groups 
are playing an intermediary role similar to VC funds, broker-dealers, or 
investment advisers, then do the regulatory schemes that apply to those 
intermediaries also apply to angel groups and their managers? 
Despite the rapid growth in angel groups, the SEC has not provided 
significant guidance on this topic.  In 2002, an angel group, the Gulf Coast 
Venture Forum (―GCVF‖), did request no-action relief on the question 
whether the organization was required to register under the Adviser Act.
258
  
The SEC declined to answer the question because GCVF's request ―[did] 
not contain adequate facts and legal analysis to enable us to evaluate it 
thoroughly.‖
259
  The SEC did note, however, that even if GCVF fell within 
the definition of an investment adviser, registration at the federal level 
would be required only if GCVF had $30 million in assets under 
management due to provisions of the Adviser Act that leave regulation of 
small advisers to the states.
260
  The SEC indicated that GCVF, which did 
 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. §§ 5-78 to -79 (citing adopting release for the hedge fund rules). 
 257. See supra text accompanying note 19 (summarizing commentary discussing 
whether angel groups violate the ban on general solicitation and trigger broker-dealer 
registration requirements). 
 258. Gulf Coast Venture Forum, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1917285 
(Aug. 21, 2002). 
 259. Id. at *1. 
 260. Id.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (2006) (explaining which advisers are subject to 
state authorities and setting a floor of $25 million in asset management before requiring 
registration with the SEC, with one noted exception).  Effective July 21, 2011, Section 410 
of the Dodd-Frank Act increases the threshold for federal registration to $100 million, 
except when an adviser is not subject to registration and examinations in its home state or 
would be required to register with more than 15 states. 
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not pool funds and left investment decisions to individual investors, 
appeared to have no assets under management.  Therefore, the SEC 
concluded that GCVF should register with the state in which it maintained 
its principal place of business if it came within the definition of an 
investment adviser. 
The GCVF no-action letter leaves many unanswered questions.  It 
does not address the general solicitation question or broker-dealer status.  It 
also does not answer whether GCVF fell within the definition of an 
investment adviser, which would be instructive not only under the Adviser 
Act but also for purposes of similar state law definitions and registration 
requirements.
261
 
Without any definitive statement by the SEC regarding the regulatory 
status of angel groups, it is necessary to piece together an analytical 
framework by looking to the general principles discussed above and the 
closest analogous situations that have been analyzed by the SEC.  In this 
case, two different forms of ―investor forums‖ are a logical starting point:  
computer-based matching services and investment symposiums. 
A. Intermediary Status 
Angel Capital Electronic Network (―ACE-Net‖) is a key no-action 
letter addressing whether organizers of an Internet-based matching service 
were required to register as broker-dealers or investment advisers.
262
  ACE-
Net was created by the SBA to connect accredited investors with 
entrepreneurs seeking financing.  The network was to be operated by local 
nonprofit entities and universities.  It included a search engine that would 
allow investors to search for companies in certain industries or in other 
potential areas of interest, such as offerings of a certain size or minority-
owned businesses.
263
 
In determining that ACE-Net was not required to register as a broker-
dealer, the SEC emphasized that ACE-Net and the local operators did not: 
Provide advice about the merits of particular investments. 
 
Participate in negotiations for transactions between participants. 
 
Receive compensation from ACE-Net users other than flat fees to 
cover administrative costs (which were not contingent on the 
 
 261. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 102(15) (2002) (defining and discussing the scope of the term 
―investment adviser‖). 
 262. Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 636094 
(Oct. 25, 1996). 
 263. Id. 
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completion of any transactions). 
 
Hold themselves out as providing securities-related services other 
than operating ACE-Net.
264
 
 In determining that ACE-Net was not required to register as an 
investment adviser, the SEC cited only the first two points.
265
  Other no-
action letters considering whether a matching service is an investment 
adviser have focused on compensation issues as well.  In one such letter, 
the SEC noted that the network operators received only administrative fees, 
and further noted that employees involved in the network‘s operation 
received only salaries commensurate with providing administrative 
services.
266
 
B. General Solicitation 
Texas Capital Network, Inc., is a key no-action letter concerning 
whether use of a matching service constitutes a general solicitation by a 
participating entrepreneur.  It involved a matching service similar to ACE-
Net operated by Texas Capital Network, Inc. (the ―Network‖).  The SEC 
determined that use of the service was not a general solicitation.
267
 
The Michigan Growth Capital Symposium no-action letter closely 
followed the logic of the computer matching service letters in considering a 
context that may be even more analogous to angel groups.  At issue was a 
symposium sponsored by the University of Michigan and organized by the 
director of a university program for studying private equity investing (the 
―Director‖).  It was an annual event attended by selected entrepreneurs, 
VC managers, and other observers such as attorneys, accountants, and 
representatives of state or local governments.  The symposium allowed 
entrepreneurs (selected and coached by the Director) to make a 12-minute 
presentation to potential investors.  The SEC determined that presenting to 
the symposium was not a general solicitation.
268
 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Technology Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 175694 
(June 5, 1992). 
 267. Texas Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 52739 (Feb. 23, 
1994); see also Arizona Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 191395 
(Apr. 21, 1998) (granting no-action relief but indicating that unrestricted generic advertising 
may constitute a general solicitation); Colorado Capital Alliance, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1995 WL 271123 (May 4, 1995) (granting relief for core matching services but 
indicating that the SEC was without sufficient detail to express any view regarding seminars 
and educational programs). 
 268. Michigan Growth Capital Symposium, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 264883 
(May 4, 1995). 
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Read together, the matching service and symposium no-action letters 
are a substantial departure from the SEC‘s customary interpretation of what 
constitutes a general solicitation.  The letters do not reference any 
preexisting relationship between participating entrepreneurs and 
participating investors (or any such relationship among participating 
investors).  In fact, the whole purpose of these forums was to engineer 
encounters between investors and entrepreneurs in markets where adequate 
relationships do not currently exist. 
The matching service and symposium no-action letters do, however, 
imply limits on the operation and design of an investor forum.  Based on 
the facts cited in the letters, they can be read as requiring four primary 
features:  that investors be accredited or otherwise sophisticated, that 
advertising or publicity be limited to the forum as a whole without 
reference to individual investments, that organizers of the forum play a 
limited role in effecting specific investments, and arguably that the forum 
serve some economic development purpose beyond generating profits for 
individual participants. 
1. Accredited or Sophisticated Investors 
The matching service no-action letters consistently emphasize that 
only accredited investors, or investors who have otherwise been determined 
to be sophisticated, may participate.
269
  The symposium no-action letter 
emphasizes that mailings promoting the forum would be directed only to 
known accredited investors.
270
 
The requirement that all investors in a matching service or symposium 
be accredited or sophisticated is consistent with the Court‘s holding in 
Ralston Purina that an offering is private if it is directed only at offerees 
who can ―fend for themselves‖ and do not need the protection of a 
registration process.
271
  One (although not the only) measure of whether an 
investor requires the protection of registration is the investor‘s financial 
sophistication.
272
  Accredited investor status, which is based on net worth 
and income standards, is a proxy for financial sophistication based on the 
assumption that wealthy investors are sophisticated or can obtain sufficient 
advice to protect their interests.
273
 
 
 269. Arizona Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267; Colorado Capital Alliance, Inc., 
supra note 267; Texas Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267. 
 270. Michigan Growth Capital Symposium, supra note 268. 
 271. Daugherty, supra note 150, at 74 (interpreting SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 
119 (1953)). 
 272. Id. at 76. 
 273. Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet:  The Elusive Promise of 
“Technological Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & 
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2. Limited Advertising 
The no-action letters are clear in providing that advertising of an 
investor forum should be ―generic,‖ meaning that it does not reference a 
particular investment opportunity.
274
  A public reference to a specific 
investment opportunity would be inconsistent with the ban on general 
solicitation because it would reach a broader audience than the investors 
who have been qualified to participate. 
The no-action letters make reference to a further limitation on the 
scope of advertising, but the scope of this limitation is a mystery.  The SEC 
has indicated that ―unrestricted advertising‖ may constitute a general 
solicitation, even if advertisements do not reference specific investments.
275
  
But the SEC has permitted advertisements in widely circulated periodicals 
such as Venture Journal
276
 and in newspapers.
277
 
3. Limited Role of Forum Organizer 
Even in the no-action letters addressing general solicitation, rather 
than intermediary status, the limited role of the matching service and 
symposium organizers figures prominently in the SEC‘s analysis. 
In Texas Capital Network, the SEC emphasized that information in the 
computer database was derived from questionnaires without investigation 
of the information by the Network.  The SEC also noted that the merits of 
potential investments were not assessed by the Network, and the Network 
did not assist in formulating the terms of investments.  The Network 
received only ―nominal administrative processing fees.‖
278
 
The Michigan Growth Symposium letter is more permissive than the 
matching service letters, allowing the Director to play a more active role 
than the matching service operators.  The Director apparently screened, 
selected, and even coached presenting companies.  Perhaps the SEC 
allowed this expanded role because it recognized that a screening function 
 
EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 22 (1998) (indicating that ―under Regulation D we presume 
sophistication from status with respect to accredited investors‖ but questioning this 
approach). 
 274. E.g., Arizona Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267; Colorado Capital Alliance, 
Inc., supra note 267; Texas Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267. 
 275. E.g., Arizona Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267 (finding that certain features of 
a matching service would not constitute a general solicitation, but stating that unrestricted 
distribution of certain advertising may constitute general solicitation); Colorado Capital 
Alliance, Inc., supra note 267 (failing to provide no-action relief with respect to the 
proposed form of advertising). 
 276. Michigan Growth Capital Symposium, supra note 268. 
 277. Texas Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267. 
 278. Id. 
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was necessary for an in-person symposium, unlike an Internet-based 
matching service that can accommodate an almost unlimited number of 
companies and investors.  In addition, the SEC might have believed that the 
in-person symposium presented less risk to investors because its 
participants were likely to be drawn primarily from the Director‘s and other 
organizers‘ personal network of contacts and because an in-person event 
imposed a natural limit on the reach of the event.  But even with this more 
permissive approach, the symposium letter was clear that the Director 
would not be making recommendations to investors, would not be involved 
in negotiations between investors and companies, and would receive 
administrative fees only.
279
 
Unlike the SEC‘s emphasis on investor status and advertising—which 
are typical factors in a general solicitation analysis—it is not obvious what 
the limited role of an investor forum operator has to do with whether a 
general solicitation has occurred.  Thinking broadly, however, the investor 
forum letters are not the only example of when reliance on an intermediary 
is relevant to whether a general solicitation has occurred.  As discussed 
above, a registered broker-dealer can form preexisting relationships in 
ways that issuers may not, such as through a website and questionnaire.
280
  
Presumably, the SEC believes that reliance on a registered intermediary 
may sufficiently improve an investor‘s ability to assess an investment 
opportunity that the ban on general solicitation (and the preexisting 
relationship requirement in particular) may be relaxed.  The investor forum 
letters can be read as standing for the related proposition that reliance on an 
unregulated intermediary may hamper an investor‘s ability to assess an 
investment opportunity and may require more rigorous application of the 
general solicitation restriction.  In this regard, the concept of a general 
solicitation is not limited to its more literal connotation of depending on the 
scope of the offering (i.e., how selective or indiscriminate the issuer was in 
selecting potential investors), but rather is a more flexible concept that can 
be relaxed or enforced more strictly based on other facts and circumstances 
bearing on whether offerees require the protections of registration. 
Repeating the factors cited in the intermediary no-action letters is 
consistent with this interpretation.  It is less likely that the forum operator is 
acting as a harmful, unqualified intermediary if it receives administrative 
fees only and is expressly prohibited from key activities such as advising 
on the merits of transactions. 
Other facts emphasized in the general solicitation letters further 
establish that the forums were investor-led rather than a service provided to 
passive investors seeking investment advice from the forum operator.  In 
 
 279. Michigan Growth Capital Symposium, supra note 268. 
 280. Berkeley & Parisi, supra note 161. 
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the matching service letters, entrepreneurs did not receive unrestricted 
access to investors.  Instead, investors determined whether to contact the 
entrepreneurs based on a summary of a business plan.
281
  In the symposium 
letter, the SEC emphasized that private placement memoranda including 
actual investment terms were not distributed at the event.  Instead, the 
participating investors heard brief presentations and then made their own 
decision whether to approach entrepreneurs to discuss investment terms.
282
 
In sum, the SEC seems to care not only that participants in an offering 
are capable of fending for themselves but also that investors are aware that 
they should be relying on their own capabilities rather than unregulated 
(and potentially unqualified) intermediaries. 
C. Nonprofit Status and Economic Development 
Involvement of nonprofit organizations or educational institutions is a 
common thread through the investor forum letters.
283
  In fact, the matching 
service no-action letters have been described as applying only to services 
operated by nonprofit entities.
284
  This interpretation has some basis in the 
SEC‘s no-action letters.  For example, the SEC declined no-action relief to 
a for-profit entity that sought to operate an Internet-based matching service 
in substantial conformance with the ACE-Net no-action letter.
285
  The SEC 
viewed the proposed service as more similar to prequalification sites 
operated or supervised by broker-dealers that seek to establish qualifying 
relationships with potential investors for future offerings.
286
  The SEC has 
allowed these prequalification sites only when a registered broker-dealer is 
involved (presumably to conduct a more rigorous suitability determination 
than merely establishing accredited investor status) and only when 
protections are in place to ensure that the service does not become a 
conduit for a particular offering.
287
 
The basis for distinguishing between for-profit and nonprofit entities 
in the investor forum letters is not clear and may have shifted over time.  In 
 
 281. Texas Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267. 
 282. Michigan Growth Capital Symposium, supra note 268. 
 283. E.g., Angel Capital Electronic Network, supra note 262 (involving nonprofit 
entities and educational institutions); Michigan Growth Capital Symposium, supra note 268 
(involving an educational institution); Texas Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267 
(regarding a nonprofit corporation). 
 284. Raymond, supra note 19, at 1-12. 
 285. Progressive Technology Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2000 WL 1508655 (Oct. 11, 
2000). 
 286. Id. 
 287. See IPONET, supra note 162 (finding that posting notices of private placements to a 
password-protected website operated in conjunction with a registered broker-dealer was not 
general solicitation); Berkeley & Parisi, supra note 161. 
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one early investor forum letter, the SEC granted no-action relief to a 
computer matching service operated by Venture Capital Network, 
Incorporated (―VCN‖), because it determined that VCN was not in the 
―business‖ of issuing reports or providing analysis of securities.
288
  The 
SEC then cited a dictionary definition of the word ―business,‖ which 
included activities undertaken for ―profit or gain.‖
289
  VCN did not meet the 
dictionary definition of a business because it had no employees, and the 
only people actually receiving any compensation for administering the 
service were employees of a governmental body that cosponsored the 
service (who could not be regulated in their roles as government 
employees).
290
  This letter could be read broadly to prohibit any personal 
financial gain in connection with a matching service. 
More recent no-action letters do not rest on the cited definition of a 
business and are not limited to the unique facts of the VCN no-action letter.  
Personnel of a nonprofit entity that operates an investor forum may receive 
compensation, as long as it is commensurate in form and amount with 
providing administrative services and does not otherwise suggest broker-
dealer or investment adviser activity.
291
 
Although financial gain is not altogether prohibited in the SEC‘s more 
recent matching service letters, there is a distinct focus in both the 
symposium and matching service letters on economic development goals 
that transcend individual wealth creation.  The parties requesting the no-
action letters consistently emphasized job creation and similar public 
benefits.
292
  In the case of the symposium letter, the SEC specifically cited 
those benefits in granting no-action relief.
293
 
Perhaps this emphasis on economic development goals and nonprofit 
status is another means of ensuring that investors participating in the forum 
 
 288. Venture Capital Network, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 45334 (May 7, 
1984). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Arizona Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267 (indicating that employees of a 
nonprofit organization involved in administering a matching service would be paid 
commensurate with other employees in a like position); Technology Capital Network, Inc., 
supra note 266. 
 292. E.g., Arizona Capital Network, Inc., supra note 267; Michigan Growth Capital 
Symposium, supra note 268 (―The objective of this activity is to help young and growing 
businesses, many of which are technology-based, to gain access to appropriate capital 
markets and to help them expand the job base in a state which is in transition from a heavy 
reliance on a declining large automotive manufacturing industry and which does not have a 
well developed venture capital and investment banking infrastructure.‖); Texas Capital 
Network, Inc., supra note 267 (―TCN‘s objective is to help generate economic growth by 
matching business ventures in various stages of development (start-up or emerging 
companies, for the most part) with potential investors.‖). 
 293. Michigan Growth Capital Symposium, supra note 268. 
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are not confused about the role of the forum organizer.  Operation by an 
educational institution, governmental body, or nonprofit organization may 
reduce the chances that investors will incorrectly assume that a securities 
professional is looking out for their interests.  There may be greater chance 
for confusion, however, when the matching service is operated to generate 
profits in a manner similar to the prequalification sites operated by 
registered broker-dealers.  This may be another example of the importance 
not only of investors being capable of fending for themselves but also of 
their knowingly taking responsibility for doing so. 
D. Application to Angel Groups 
This section applies the principles described above to current forms of 
angel groups and argues that angel groups, even those with active managers 
receiving substantial compensation, do not necessarily violate the ban on 
general solicitation or require registration as intermediaries.  Other 
commentators have noted potential legal risks associated with angel 
groups, but at a general level without discussion of the full range of angel 
group forms.
294
  This section tries to provide a more complete picture of the 
regulatory landscape for angel groups by identifying which specific forms 
operate in the areas of greatest uncertainty.   
1. Similarities to Investor Forums 
With respect to portions of the investor forum letters relating most 
directly to general solicitation concerns, most angel groups operate 
similarly to a matching service or investment symposium.   
For example, it is standard practice for angel groups to limit 
participation to accredited investors.  This practice recognizes that the 
company will likely rely on Rule 506 in selling the securities and will want 
to limit sales to accredited investors in order to avoid burdensome 
disclosure requirements.
295
 
Angel groups also advertise and promote themselves in ways that are 
consistent with the investor forum letters.  Most angel groups are not hard 
 
 294. Ibrahim, supra note 4.  Michael Raymond states that investor forum no-action 
letters are available to nonprofit organizations only, without addressing what this means for 
actively managed angel groups.  Raymond, supra note 19, at 12.  Darian Ibrahim also does 
not discuss actively managed angel groups.  He does analyze whether an investor is a 
broker-dealer by receiving stock as a reward for leading due diligence during the group's 
selection process.  Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 759.  Ibrahim proposes a new exemption for this 
practice.  Id. at 761.  The risk to an investor, however, should be low if it is an isolated 
occurrence.  See supra note 181. 
 295. PRESTON, supra note 55, at 6. 
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to find through a website,
296
 and the group may welcome publicity through 
local media and community organizations.  But as long as any 
advertisements or public statements promote the group as a whole, and not 
investment in an individual portfolio company, it is hard to distinguish 
these publicity efforts from the ―small classified ads‖ permitted in the 
Texas Capital no-action letter or the Venture Journal advertisement 
permitted by the symposium letter, notwithstanding the SEC‘s 
unarticulated concern over ―unrestricted‖ advertising.
297
 
In fact, localized angel groups should raise less concern regarding 
general solicitation than a computer matching service.  To the extent the 
number of offerees matters, an angel group has a discrete size (typically 
from 20 to 125 members).
298
  Some angel groups are very selective about 
membership, including requiring a recommendation of an existing member 
or specific expertise.
299
  In contrast, the matching service letters do not 
reference any numerical limitation on the number of participants or 
qualifications other than accredited investor status. 
2. Economic Development Benefits 
If it is also necessary to identify economic development benefits from 
angel groups in order to draw upon the investor forum no-action letters, 
there is plenty of grist for the mill.  Policymakers laud angel groups as a 
way to close the funding gap.  For example, in congressional hearings on 
the termination of the SBA‘s Participating Securities program, angel 
groups were specifically identified as an important alternative source of 
funding.
300
  The fact that angel groups are viewed as a replacement for a 
public program suggests a public benefit beyond personal wealth creation.  
The potential public benefit of angel groups is also evidenced by nonprofit 
organizations that have been established to study and foster their 
 
 296. Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 743 (―[W]hile informal angels prefer anonymity, angel 
groups are exactly the opposite.  Most of them have their own websites, like VCs, and are 
also easily found through a few clicks on the ACA‘s website.‖). 
 297. See supra text accompanying notes 274-278. 
 298. PRESTON, supra note 55, at 31 (citing CVR study results indicating that informal 
angel groups typically have no more than 20 members, nonprofit groups typically have from 
25 to 125 members, and LLCs (typically funds) often limit membership to 50 to 75 
investors). 
 299. Id. (indicating that ―[m]ost groups appear to require a current member‘s 
recommendation or sponsorship for a new, potential member‖); Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 
744 (―[A] small number of angel groups limit membership to those angels with expertise in 
a particular industry . . . . Some angel groups that do not limit membership by industry do 
limit membership to angels with technical experience and thereby exclude lawyers, 
accountants, and other ‗non-techies‘.‖). 
 300. Participating Securities Hearings, supra note 6, at 8, 9, 52-63. 
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development.
301
 
Claims of economic development benefits are particularly strong in 
regions where significant VC funding is not available.  Angel groups have 
been identified as a way to foster an entrepreneurial economy outside of 
VC hot spots.
302
 
3. The Harder Question: Intermediary Status of Actively Managed 
Groups 
Whether an angel group complies with portions of the investor forum 
letters relating most directly to intermediary status, however, greatly 
depends on the specific structure of the group.  Intermediary status should 
be of minimal concern to volunteer-based groups that rely on investor 
volunteers or that use a modest administrative staff compensated from 
proceeds of member dues, presenting company fees, and sponsorships.  
Such an administrative staff is unlikely to have a significant role in 
advising on the merits of transactions or negotiating investment terms, and 
their compensation is not transaction-based.
303
 
The manager of an actively managed group, however, may not fit 
within the letter of the investor forum letters insofar as those letters 
contemplate a limited role for the forum operator.  An active group 
manager may provide services that, at first glance, look like advising on the 
merits of investments.  For example, the manager may prescreen 
entrepreneur submissions to identify strong candidates
304
 and may 
participate in negotiations with the portfolio company.
305
  Moreover, active 
managers may receive fees similar to those received by VC managers, 
including a management fee equal to a percentage of committed funds and 
a carried interest, rather than the administrative fees received by the 
operators of the investor forums.
306
 
 
 301. See id. at 60 (discussing the Angel Capital Foundation, a 501(c)(3) organization that 
studies angel investing and angel groups). 
 302. Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 745-53 (arguing that angel groups have distinct advantages 
over VC funds and state-sponsored funding in non-tech regions). 
 303. See PRESTON, supra note 55, at 38 (discussing sources of revenues to cover 
administrative support for volunteer-based groups). 
 304. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
 305. Id. 
 306. See PRESTON, supra note 55, at 24 (citing Washington Dinner Club as an example 
of an actively managed group that compensates its manager through a management fee and 
15% carried interest); id. at 39 (indicating that a management fee equal to 2-3% of 
committed capital and carried interest is typical compensation for an actively managed 
group). 
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4. Availability of VC Exemptions 
If an actively managed angel group has a difficult time complying 
with the investor forum letters because of features that resemble VC funds, 
it is worth considering whether VC exemptions from intermediary 
regulations are available to angel group managers.  If so, any departure 
from the investor forum letters may not matter.  As discussed below, 
however, VC exemptions are only a partial solution to the regulatory 
concerns of angel groups.   
Like VC managers, active angel group managers are likely not broker-
dealers because their ongoing management role with the group
307
 and their 
status as manager of the LLC formed for the investment
308
 qualifies them 
for the issuer exemption.
309
 
When it comes to potential investment adviser regulation, however, 
the analysis is less straightforward.  For example, structuring an angel 
group as an LLC may allow an active manager to claim the benefit of the 
private adviser exemption for advisers to fewer than 15 funds, just like a 
VC manager, because the LLC is a single client.
310
  In the future, an angel 
group manager may be able to take advantage of the exemption for VC 
funds
311
 or for advisers to private funds
312
 to be established under the Dodd-
Frank Act.  The benefit of these exemptions is limited, however, by the fact 
that an adviser with less than the threshold amount under management for 
federal registration will be subject to registration in its home state,
313
 which 
may or may not provide an applicable exemption for advisers to a small 
number of clients.
314
 
In the absence of the private adviser exemption, an active angel group 
 
 307. See id. at 44 (―Managers are valuable for follow-on communications and updates, as 
can be executive directors‖.). 
 308. See id. at 27 (―LLCs work well for manager-led funds, even with group members 
desiring active involvement in group management or governance, since the manager can be 
designated as the managing member or given other designated authority . . . .‖). 
 309. See supra text accompanying note 237 (discussing applicability of the issuer‘s 
exception to VC managers). 
 310. See supra text accompanying notes 245-247 (discussing the private adviser 
exception). 
 311. Dodd-Frank Act § 407. 
 312. Id. § 408.  This exemption will apply to advisers of funds that would be investment 
companies but for Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act, provided the 
adviser has less than $150 million under management. 
 313. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (2006). 
 314. LEMKE & LINS, supra note 206, at 22 (―Many states also have exemptions from 
registration for advisers with a limited number of clients or only certain institutional clients 
(e.g., banks, insurance companies, etc.).  However, it should be noted that these state 
exemptions may be more strict in some respects than the Advisers Act (e.g., limiting an 
adviser to only five clients).‖). 
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manager may, like a VC manager, take the position that it simply does not 
constitute an investment adviser as defined in the Adviser Act and 
comparable state definitions
315
 because its activities are sufficiently distinct 
from those of the defendants in the Abrahamson case.
316
  But an angel 
group manager cannot rely on the same arguments advanced by 
VC managers.  VC managers cite their total control of the pooled funds as a 
reason for why their activities are qualitatively different from those of a 
traditional investment adviser, even one with discretionary authority over 
an account.
317
  An angel group manager, on the other hand, does not have 
that degree of control because investment decisions are made through an 
investor-led process such as a majority vote of investors.  An angel group 
manager might, therefore, cite its limited control and the investors‘ primary 
responsibility for investment decisions as the basis for a non-adviser 
approach. 
For an angel group manager to make a compelling non-adviser 
argument, it must articulate what role it plays if not providing investment 
advice.  In this regard, analogies can be drawn to the no-action letters 
discussed above relating to investment software tools and educational 
programming.  The software no-action letters can be read as distinguishing 
between rendering investment advice to passive investors and providing 
content-neutral tools based on generally available information.
318
  Like 
those software tools, an angel group manager designs a process that enables 
members of the group to evaluate investment opportunities for themselves, 
but it is only a tool and does not purport to make ultimate recommendations 
to investors.  Similarly, the Missouri Innovation Center no-action letter 
discussed above can be read as distinguishing between rendering 
investment advice and providing education to individuals who want to 
learn how to invest for themselves.
319
  This distinction between education 
and advice is helpful because members of angel groups often cite education 
as a primary reason for their participation.
320
 
5. The Hardest Issue: Transaction-Based Compensation 
Regardless of whether an angel group manager tries to address 
 
 315. See supra note 209. 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 240-244. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See supra text accompanying notes 212-213 (discussing EJV Partners, L.P., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 372147 (Dec. 7, 1992), and other no-action letters regarding 
computer and data services). 
 319. See supra text accompanying note 214 (discussing Missouri Innovation Center, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 643949 (Oct. 17, 1995)). 
 320. See supra note 58. 
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intermediary status by complying with the specific contours of the investor 
forum letters
321
 or takes a non-adviser approach like some VC managers, 
the form of compensation to the angel group manager will be important to 
the analysis.  If an angel group manager receives a management fee and a 
carried interest (rather than the administrative fees referenced in the 
investor forum letters) is that indicative of broker-dealer or investment 
adviser activity? 
The analysis should turn on two questions:  (1) whether the form of 
compensation reveals that the true nature of the service is dispensing 
investment advice (for investment adviser status) or effecting securities 
transactions (for broker-dealer status) and (2) whether it poses any special 
risk to investors.
322
 
As discussed above, a management fee based on a percentage of 
committed funds is sufficiently distinct from a sales commission that it 
should not indicate broker-dealer status under the two-part test.
323
 
A carried interest might initially appear suggestive of broker-dealer 
status because it is to some extent dependent on completion of securities 
transactions—each completed investment is an opportunity for a fee.  But 
examined closely under the two-part test, a carried interest does not 
indicate broker-dealer activity. 
First, a carried interest does not strongly suggest that the true nature of 
the services is effecting transactions in securities because the amount of 
compensation ultimately earned depends on the long-term outcome of the 
investments rather than the completion or frequency of transactions.  It 
therefore appears that the intermediary is being compensated either for 
services that affect the quality of investments as they are initially made (for 
example, investment advice)
324
 or for activities that enhance the value of 
the securities after they are purchased.  A commission, in contrast, is 
earned as soon as transactions are completed regardless of the long-term 
results.  From this perspective, a carried interest is significantly less 
indicative of broker-dealer activity than is a traditional commission. 
Second, a carried interest does not create the same risks to investors as 
 
321.  For example, an angel group would demonstrate fidelity to the investor forum letters 
by: designating a committee of investors (rather than the manager) to screen applicants, 
perform due diligence, and negotiate transactions; formulating standard investment terms to 
reduce the role of the manager in negotiations; reducing the carried interest from the VC 
standard of 20% to 10% to demonstrate a reduced role of the manager; and pursuing 
partnerships with nonprofits to underscore the public benefits of the group.  
 322. See supra text accompanying notes 219-229. 
 323. See supra text accompanying notes 188-232. 
 324. Broker-dealers may provide purchase or sell recommendations to clients, but that 
function is incidental to their primary function of locating buyers and sellers and handling 
the mechanics of completing transactions.  See Pruit & Hart, supra note 177, at 30-65 
(discussing Section 202(a)(ii)(c) of the Investment Adviser Act). 
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traditional transaction-based compensation.  Because the intermediary is 
compensated only if the investment is a good one, the incentives of the 
investor and the intermediary are far more aligned than would be the case 
with a commission that is fixed as of the purchase date. 
Whether a carried interest and management fee indicates investment 
adviser status under the two-part test is less clear. 
A management fee does not reveal much about the nature of the 
services performed by an angel group manager.  For example, more 
committed funds will likely result in additional monitoring, tax reporting, 
and investor communication responsibilities.  These responsibilities all 
arise after investment decisions have been made and after any investment 
advice may be rendered.  Additional committed funds also may indicate 
that there are more investors to coordinate and more risk if the manager 
fails to discharge her duties as manager.  It is therefore plausible that 
management fees compensate the manager for something other than 
investment advice. 
Nor does receipt of a management fee pose any particular risk to the 
members of the group.  In fact, a management fee based on funds under 
management is a preferred form of compensation under the Adviser Act.
325
 
Whether a carried interest indicates investment adviser status is the 
most difficult question.  A carried interest bases compensation on the 
success of investments and would be a logical way to compensate someone 
for giving investment advice.  But there are many other responsibilities of 
an angel group manager that affect investment outcomes and for which a 
carried interest would be appropriate compensation.  For example, 
investment outcomes are affected by the quality of the evaluation process 
designed by the manager, the number of companies the manager can attract 
to apply to the group, and the manager‘s post-investment monitoring of and 
managerial assistance to portfolio companies.
326
 
As to investor risk, a carried interest is a performance fee and 
therefore might be cause for concern.
327
  But the factors that make a 
performance fee acceptable in the context of a VC fund (or business 
development company) under applicable exemptions are also present in the 
context of an angel group.
328
  Illiquid investments limit the manager‘s 
ability to manipulate timing of investment decisions, and substantial 
 
 325. See LEMKE & LINS, supra note 206, at 154 (describing a fee based on assets under 
management as a ―typical advisory fee‖). 
 326. See Wiltbank, At the Individual Level, supra note 11, at 6, 10 (discussing how post-
investment monitoring improves angel investing outcomes). 
 327. See supra text accompanying notes 221-223. 
 328. See supra text accompanying notes 226-227 (discussing exceptions to the 
prohibition on performance fees, including for business development companies and 
qualified purchasers). 
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ongoing obligations of the manager are an opportunity cost that causes the 
manager to internalize the cost of failed investments.  Finally, the standard 
practice of requiring group members to be accredited ensures a certain level 
of sophistication in evaluating the fee structure.  On balance, even a carried 
interest is not particularly indicative of investment adviser status. 
6. Are the Investor Forum Letters Even Necessary? 
Based on the discussion above, it appears that an actively managed 
angel group can address intermediary status questions in one of two ways:  
(1) try to structure the group in a way that permits the strongest possible 
analogy to the investor forums or (2) argue on general principles (like some 
VC funds do) that the group manager simply plays a different role than 
providing investment advice or effecting securities transactions.   
Arguments based on general principles may be sufficient for angel groups 
that are selective in accepting new members, just as they apparently are for 
many VC managers.  Those angel groups that broadly solicit members, 
however, may be in a different situation.  The difficulty arises because an 
angel group that broadly solicits members is doing something qualitatively 
different from a VC fund—it is potentially engaging in a general 
solicitation of investors to participate in the group. 
To explain further, a VC fund and an angel group structured as an 
LLC are each involved in two forms of securities transactions:  an 
―upstream‖ investment in portfolio companies and a ―downstream‖ sale of 
interests in the VC fund or angel group LLC to participating investors.  The 
manner in which VC funds and angel groups solicit submissions by 
entrepreneurs for upstream investments in portfolio companies is similar 
and unproblematic.  Although rarely analyzed, it appears acceptable for a 
VC fund to publicly request submissions by entrepreneurs.
329
 
When it comes to the ―downstream‖ solicitation of investors in the 
fund or angel group LLC, however, VC funds and angel groups may 
operate differently.  VC managers are required to make downstream sales 
to fund investors in compliance with generally applicable requirements of 
private offering exemptions, including the ban on general solicitation.  
Therefore, a VC fund manager would not engage in broad solicitations or 
open advertisements for new investors.  In contrast, an angel group that is 
not selective in admitting new members (requiring accredited investor 
status only) without adhering to the investor forum no-action letters risks 
violating the ban on general solicitation with respect to the downstream 
sale of LLC interests to group members.  It is advantageous, therefore, for 
 
 329. See supra note 158. 
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the manager of an angel group to operate substantially in conformance with 
the investor forum no-action letters
330
 because they provide a framework 
for addressing the twin concerns of general solicitation and intermediary 
status. 
Neither of the options currently available to angel group managers 
provides adequate certainty.  For example, the VC industry felt it necessary 
to obtain special statutory exemptions because the SEC is reluctant to 
embrace the non-adviser approach.
331
  An angel group manager likely faces 
a similar level of uncertainty in arguing that it does not provide investment 
advice.  Trying to comply with the investor forum letters is also 
problematic in light of any no-action letter's limited precedential value
332
 
and the SEC's failure to articulate its underlying reasoning in granting no-
action relief.  Either approach requires relying on untested arguments 
regarding whether a carried interest indicates investment adviser or broker-
dealer activity.  For an increasingly common and favored from of 
investing,
333
 angel groups should have regulatory clarity, not just good 
arguments.    
VI. REFORM PROPOSAL 
This part outlines a new approach to regulating startup company 
finance that reflects current best understandings of angel investing.  The 
goal is to focus squarely on whether investors require the protection of 
registration rather than on ancillary concepts like general solicitation or 
transaction-based compensation which are difficult to apply or impractical 
in the context of startup company finance.  The hope is that a more focused 
approach enhances the ability of entrepreneurs and intermediaries to 
comply and will be more accommodating to new developments that are 
helpful to investors. 
This article proposes a new exemption under Regulation D with the 
following features: 
The new exemption would be available only to privately held 
operating companies.  It would not be available to entities 
primarily holding or developing real estate, investment funds 
(other than those investing in startup companies), or publicly 
traded companies. 
 
The exemption would apply if all sales are made to accredited 
 
330.  See supra note 321.   
331.  See supra note 244. 
332.  See supra note 21.   
333.  See supra note 300.   
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investors, with the added requirements below. 
 
To qualify as accredited under the new exemption, an investor 
would need to meet the current income or net-worth standard and 
one of the following: 
The investor owns or manages investments
334
 in excess of $1.5 million; 
The investor has served as a director or executive officer of a company 
that, during the investor's service, sold at least $1 million of securities in 
Regulation D offerings; or 
The proposed investment does not exceed 10% of the investor‘s net 
worth. 
The ban on general solicitation and advertising would be 
eliminated if the above requirements are met. 
 
Registration as a broker-dealer or investment adviser would not 
be required because of involvement in transactions under the new 
exemption. 
The proposed exemption could preempt state requirements to register 
sales of securities that qualify under the exemption,
335
 but applicable 
federal statutes would not provide for preemption of state investment 
adviser or broker-dealer registration requirements.  Preempting those 
intermediary regulations would likely require an act of Congress.  The 
extent to which federal securities laws should preempt state private offering 
regulations is controversial.
336
  The exemption proposed by this article 
would improve federal law regardless of preemption, and states could 
independently adopt similar reforms tailored to their current requirements. 
A. Context-Specific 
Efforts to reform private offering regulation are inhibited by the vast 
range of economic activity regulated by the SEC.  This broad charge starts 
with the Securities Act‘s definition of a security,
337
 which covers not only 
 
 334. For this purpose, ―investments‖ could be defined similarly to the way the term is 
defined for purposes of determining ―qualified purchaser‖ status under the Investment 
Company Act.  That definition generally includes securities, real estate, commodities, and 
cash and cash equivalents to the extent held for investment purposes.  See 17 C.F.R. § 
270.2a51-1 (2010) (defining investments for the purposes of determining qualified 
purchasers). 
 335. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2006). 
 336. See Alan M. Parness, From the Chair–Random Rants and Raves, THE BLUE SKY 
BUGLE (A.B.A., Chi., Ill.), Apr. 2009, at 3-5 (arguing against proposals to limit the 
presumptive effects of Rule 506). 
 337. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006). 
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startup company stock but also securities of Fortune 500 companies offered 
to institutional investors,
338
 interests in real estate,
339
 and a broad catchall 
category of ―investment contracts‖ encompassing a wide range of 
economic arrangements.
340
 
When regulating a wide variety of conduct, it may be advisable for 
regulators to have discretion in interpreting the scope of registration 
requirements, like the general solicitation framework.  But within a specific 
context where investors demonstrate an ability to fend for themselves and 
more prescriptive regulations become counterproductive, regulations can 
be more permissive. 
The proposed exemption relaxes some elements of current regulations 
because it mirrors circumstances in which angel investors have 
demonstrated success.  For example, the modified criteria for accredited 
investor status generally reflect the angel investor profile that has emerged 
in recent studies.
341
  The first additional requirement (ownership of 
$1.5 million in investments) roughly corresponds to the average angel 
investment portfolio under the Wiltbank study.
342
  But studies of angel 
investing suggest that entrepreneurial experience is as important as 
financial sophistication or resources.
343
  Therefore, an investor may also 
qualify by experience at a company that has been through the fundraising 
process.  Finally, an investor can qualify because the proposed investment 
does not threaten a large portion (more than 10%) of the investor‘s 
financial resources.
344
  This allows those with no demonstrated financial or 
entrepreneurial experience to dip their toes in the pool through a local angel 
group with the opportunity to learn from more experienced investors.
345
 
The proposed rule also responds to the specific needs of startup 
companies by relaxing intermediary registration requirements.  Because an 
adequate market for traditional intermediaries has not emerged for startup 
companies,
346
 intermediary registration requirements have become 
 
 338. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 246-264 
(5th ed. 2004) (―The catalogue of these schemes is as variegated as the imaginations of 
promoters.‖). 
 339. See generally Alvin Robert Thorup, TIC or Treat:  How Tenant-in-Common Real 
Estate Sales Can Avoid the Reach of the Securities Laws, 34 REAL ESTATE L.J. 422 (2006) 
(discussing when certain interests in real estate are securities). 
 340. LOSS & SELIGMEN, supra note 338, at 401. 
 341. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
 342.  Wiltbank, At the Individual Level, supra note 11, at 3 (finding that respondents held 
an average of $1.3 million in angel investments). 
 343. Id. 
 344. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE 460-44A-504(3)(d)(i) (using this standard as a proxy for 
suitability). 
 345. See supra text accompanying note 51. 
 346. See sources cited supra notes 169 and 202. 
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counterproductive in protecting investors.  Relaxing registration 
requirements may provide enough flexibility for new forms of 
intermediaries to emerge. 
B. Objective Application 
The most common criticism of current regulations is that Section 4(2) 
and Regulation D are difficult for issuers to apply.  Judicial interpretations 
by lower courts following Ralston Purina applied a number of factors in 
sometimes inconsistent ways when considering whether a particular 
offering qualified as private.  The state of the case law led the author of one 
article to warn:  ―An accurate, succinct statement of the whole body of law 
under Section 4(2) is beyond the scope of this Article, if not indeed beyond 
the power of humanity.‖
347
  The SEC‘s attempt to clarify matters through 
Regulation D has not eliminated uncertainty due largely to the ban on 
general solicitation and its fact-specific focus on preexisting relationships. 
A legal rule should be easy to follow in order to take advantage of the 
teaching, or ―pedagogical,‖ function the law can serve.  As Patrick 
Daugherty wrote 20 years ago: 
[I]t often was said (years ago) that pointing out the borders of 
lawful conduct will only furnish the Holmesian ―bad man‖ with a 
―roadmap to fraud.‖  As applied to securities offerings, this 
philosophy is self-defeating.  Since general solicitation is neither 
malum in se nor otherwise self-evident, it must be made 
comprehensible if compliance is to be expected . . . . The Staff 
disserves the pedagogical function of the law when it declines to 
give a straight answer to a straight rule 502(c) question, asserting 
instead that the ―facts and circumstances‖ are critical and 
accessible only to the issuer‘s lawyer.
348
 
That the law of private placements can positively influence investing 
behavior, rather than simply punish wrongdoing, is observable in the 
operation of angel groups.  Disclaimers on websites operated by volunteer-
based groups emphasize specific factors cited in the investor forum letters, 
including that the group operators do not provide investment advice, 
negotiate terms, receive transaction-based compensation, or hold 
themselves out as a securities professional.
349
  If there were similar 
 
 347. Daugherty, supra note 150, at 76-77. 
 348. Id. at 124. 
 349. E.g., Legal Disclaimer, ALLIANCE OF ANGELS, 
http://www.allianceofangels.com/legal.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).  See also PRESTON, 
supra note 55, at app. 2 (providing a sample form of membership agreement for a member-
led group that includes similar disclaimer language). 
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guidance for actively managed angel groups, they too could be expected to 
follow it. 
The proposed exemption would provide more meaningful guidance to 
issuers than current law.  Startup companies are accustomed to making 
determinations of accredited investor status under the existing standards 
and could do the same under the proposed exemption. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Actively managed angel groups are breaking new ground by 
combining elements of informal angel networks with elements of 
VC investing.  As a result, they may not fit neatly into either the investor 
forum letters or VC fund exemptions from intermediary regulation.  But 
that does not mean they run afoul of intermediary registration requirements 
or the ban on general solicitation.  Examined closely, these groups are a 
collaborative effort by capable investors to actively invest their own funds 
more effectively than they could individually.  Thus, the underlying logic 
of the investor forum letters applies, even if the manager‘s form of 
compensation and duties diverge from some of the facts cited in the letters. 
Ideally, it would not take fifty law review pages to find a foothold in 
the regulatory framework for a form of investor self-help like angel groups.  
Properly oriented regulations would not get so bogged down in ancillary 
questions of transaction-based compensation and pre-existing relationships.  
The reform proposed by this article would put the best current information 
about angel investing to use with the idea of reorienting the regulatory 
framework to focus on demonstrated conditions for successful investment 
in a market that policy makers are desperately seeking to encourage.  
Hopefully, the SEC can keep this context-specific approach in mind as it 
fulfills its current mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act to review 
fundamental aspects of its private offering regulations. 
